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Dissertation Overview
My thesis contributes to a growing literature in health economics by analyzing three
empirical research questions related to family policies: What is the the short- to long-run
effect of parental leave duration on maternal health? Is there an impact of maternal labor
force participation during pregnancy on newborn health? How do birth allowances affect
fertility, newborn to infant health, and birth scheduling? In this introduction, I briefly
summarize the chapters’ research questions and main findings. All three chapters have
in common that they answer highly topical questions in the domain of family policies,
i.e. parental leave policies and family allowances. Further, to properly answer the stated
questions, I make use of two key ingredients: First, I use rich administrative data from
Austria for Chapters 1 and 2, and from Switzerland for Chapter 3. Second, I employ
adequate and modern empirical techniques to report causal estimates.
For both Chapters 1 and 2, I exploit variation from three policy changes in parental
leave duration in Austria. Specifically, Austria increased parental leave by 1 year to
2 years in July 1990. They partially reversed this again in July 1996 by exclusively
reserving 6 months to fathers so that maternal leave was essentially reduced to 1.5 years.
Finally in July 2000, there was a large extension in paid parental leave by 1 year to
2.5 years. Enforcement of all of these changes was very strict, meaning that mothers
who gave birth in June prior to any of the policy changes would be entitled to the old
leave duration and July mothers to the new one. This sharp discontinuity allows me to
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employ a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in Chapters 1 and 2. This method
guarantees that mothers pre- and post-policy change are comparable in both observable
and unobservable characteristics in absence of the policy change. This highlights that the
only difference of these mothers across the cutoff is the result of the policy change itself.
For both Chapters, I rely on administrative data from Austria where I combine several
different data sets. To identify private-sector employed mothers who were subject to the
policy changes, I use the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which covers the
complete working history of every worker in Austria. With the ASSD, I have detailed
information on every birth of employed mothers and their actual parental leave duration
these mothers take. I can link the ASSD to the Austrian Birth Register (ABR) covering
newborn health outcomes and additional individual-level characteristics of the mother,
such as her education, marital status, and origin. In Chapter 1, where I study maternal
health up to the long-run, I additionally merge the data to health outcomes recorded in
the Health Insurance Data from the Statutory Health Insurance Fund (SHIF) of Upper
Austria. This final data set records every outpatient doctor visit, prescribed medication,
and hospital stays including diagnosis from 1998 to 2007.
I analyze the short- to long-run health effects of maternal leave duration in Chapter 1
and I find a hump-shaped relationship between parental leave length and maternal health.
The first two reforms improve maternal outpatient health. However, health outcomes are
getting substantially worse with long leave of 2.5 years. This effect is mainly driven
by mental health outcomes. However, there is substantial heterogeneity. The initial
increase in leave length is especially good for low-wage and unmarried mothers. Reducing
leave duration harms mothers with unhealthy babies, proxied by a preterm birth or low
birth weight baby. Substantially increasing leave duration is, though, especially bad for
maternal health of those mothers who already suffered from mental diseases pre-birth.
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Chapter 2 studies the effect of maternal employment during pregnancy on newborn
health. Based on the three reforms on parental leave duration, I find that maternal em-
ployment during pregnancy with the second child reacts strongly to these policy changes.
The share of employed mothers sharply declined in 1990 by 19.1 percentage points, in-
creased in 1996 by 7.2 percentage points and declined again by 6.4 percentage points in
2000. None of these changes in prenatal employment translated into effects on newborn
health measured via birth weight, gestational length, and Apgar scores. This result holds
true for mothers of different socioeconomic backgrounds and across industries. The effect
is precisely estimated, which suggests that prenatal employment prior to the 32nd week
of pregnancy does not causally affect the fetus for measures visible at birth.
In Chapter 3, written jointly with Patrick Keller, we analyze the impact of birth
allowances (so called baby bonus) on fertility, newborn health, and birth scheduling in
Switzerland. We exploit the unique quasi-experimental setting of Switzerland’s family
allowances system. In this system, cantons are free to choose whether they want to
implement birth allowances and how much they want to pay. During the last 50 years,
11 cantons have introduced a baby bonus, all increase the amount paid thereafter, and 2
cantons even abolish the baby bonus after all. This gives rise to a lot of cantonal variation.
Thus, we use a difference-in-differences setting where we can analyze, due to several policy
changes over time, both the introduction and the intensity of the treatment. Further, we
employ a graphical event study analysis to study birth scheduling on the basis of daily
birth counts. This allows us to understand whether parents are willing to shift births due
to financial incentives.
We then combine these policy changes with administrative outcome data covering the
universe of births, stillbirths and infant deaths in Switzerland from 1969 to 2017. On the
one hand, we do not find evidence for birth scheduling. On the other hand, we find a
3
small and positive impact on fertility measures, a significant and sizable reduction of the
stillbirth rate, and a significant but small increase in birth weight. While the latter effect
is in absolute terms relatively small, the decline in the stillbirth rate is substantial. This
robust reduction of the stillbirth rate, is especially strong for older or foreign mothers, and
is almost exclusively driven by increases in the birth allowances in the early observation
years (1969–1993).
All three chapters highlight the importance of studying alternative and indirect out-
come measures in addition to the direct measures targeted by policy makers. In Chapter
1, for example, long-run maternal health effects of parental leave duration are clearly a
side-effect as parental leave policies target mostly early child development and maternal
labor market possibilities. As these policies are expensive to implement, the negative
long-run health consequences of too long leave duration should be taken into account by
policy makers. The same reasoning holds true for Chapter 2, where I argue that there
is no additional benefit for the health of newborns if mothers can stay home and do not
have to work during pregnancy due to longer parental leave for their first child. Finally,
in Chapter 3 we only find little fertility effects, the directly targeted outcome measure,
but a sizable and significant reduction in the stillbirth rate as well as a positive impact
on birth weight, supporting the beneficial impact of birth allowances in Switzerland.
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Chapter 1
Long-term Effects of Parental Leave
Duration on Maternal Health:
Evidence from Three Policy Changes
in Austria
1.1 Introduction
There is substantial variation in parental leave policies across the globe. The difference
across countries in leave length has even widened over the last decades. This is because
most European countries tend to increase paid parental leave duration to levels of usually
around a year. The United States, instead, offers only 12 weeks of unpaid leave. This is the
ground for an ongoing debate on optimal leave policies. To feed into further debate, most
research has focused on evaluating leave policies with respect to child development and
maternal labor market outcomes. Maternal health, however, as an additional outcome,
has mostly been neglected in the literature so far. This is surprising in light of the
5
worldwide increase of health costs.
This paper provides evidence on the effect of parental leave duration on maternal
health in the short- and long-run. The few studies that have already focused on this
topic hint toward diminishing returns to longer leave. A priori, it is not clear whether
there might be a tipping point where longer leave duration could even become harmful
for mothers. On top of that, mechanisms for improving or deteriorating maternal health
might vary along the leave duration. While physical relaxation from giving birth and
breastfeeding have been shown to be dominant drivers for improving health when leave is
short, these forces are unlikely to continue to exist after a certain amount of months on
leave (Chung et al., 2007; Dagher et al., 2014).
In this study, I investigate the effect of three parental leave reforms in Austria. Those
reforms increased maternal leave from 1 year to 2 years in 1990; partially decreased
maternal leave by six months to 1.5 years in 1996; and increased maternal leave again to
2.5 years in 2000. For the subset of mothers who live in Upper Austria, I can evaluate
these policy changes with maternal health outcomes from 1998 to 2007. This allows
me to observe mothers 1 year pre-birth up to 17 years post-birth when combining all
three reforms. Health outcomes are observed in the Statutory Health Insurance Fund
and provide information on all outpatient doctor visits including prescriptions and all
inpatient hospitalizations.
I find a hump-shaped relationship between maternal health and leave length. The
1990 reform, which increased maternal leave by 1 year, substantially decreases medication
costs. The 1996 reform, which decreased maternal leave by six months, does not show
significant effects but the effect sign on costs is negative. This indicates that maternal
health if anything improves. Finally, the 2000 reform, which increased maternal leave to
2.5 years, significantly increases the total outpatient costs. For all three reforms, there
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seems to be a trade-off between inpatient and outpatient health outcomes. For both the
1990 and 2000 reform, inpatient health, measured in days of hospitalizations, significantly
moves into the other direction than outpatient health.
An analysis of the type of medications prescribed and diagnoses when hospitalized
reveals that especially medications prescribed for the nervous system and analgesics
(painkillers) can explain this pattern. Diagnoses and medications related to cardiovascular
health, though, are not significantly affected by any of the three reforms.
In a dynamic analysis, where I follow mothers over time, I can show that effects only
start to become significant several years after birth. This may explain why studies that
focused on outcomes measured relatively shortly after birth could not find any significant
effects. Later on, effects continue to accumulate over time, which suggests that the full
extent of the reforms may not even be completely evaluated at the end of my observation
period.
A heterogeneity analysis reveals interesting additional patterns. Whether long or
short leave is better for maternal health strongly depends on her own characteristics
(both socioeconomic and health) and the health status of her child. Mothers with a high-
socioeconomic status benefit less from an extension of parental leave to 2 years. The
same holds true for married mothers. In the baseline analysis of the 1996 reform, where
maternal leave declines, most of the effects are not significant. This is not the case for
mothers with unhealthy babies (i.e. born preterm or with a low birth weight). These
types of newborns may need extra time with their mothers and thus, a shorter leave
may also be stressful for their mothers and deteriorate their health significantly along all
dimensions. Finally, the 2000 reform, which increased leave substantially, is especially
harmful for mothers who already suffered from mental disorders prior to giving birth.
This indicates that a stable work environment could be crucial for their mental health.
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The literature on parental leave and family health, especially maternal health, is rela-
tively young. This literature emphasizes that the returns depend on several key features.
First, the timing of measurement matters. Therefore, the effects on maternal health dif-
fer whether they are measured in the short- versus long-run. Second, the initial level of
parental leave and the extent to which parental leave is increased are both key influenc-
ing factors. As such, an introduction is more beneficial than an increase at an already
generous level of parental leave. Third, low-socioeconomic status (SES) mothers benefit
more from generous parental leave settings than high-SES mothers.
More specifically, the three most related studies highlight the following facts: Baker
and Milligan (2008b) evaluate an increase in parental leave in Canada from 6 to 12 months
and find no significant effects on self-reported maternal health measured up to 2 years
after giving birth. Beuchert et al. (2016), who study a reform in Denmark that increased
maternity leave by on average 32 days, find small positive effects on the health of mothers
who can be followed up to five years after giving birth. They show that benefits are higher
for low-income families. Finally, the most recent study by Butikofer et al. (2018), which
analyzes the introduction of paid parental leave in Norway and several extensions of it
on maternal health at age 40, reports positive effects of the introduction and diminishing
marginal returns on several health measures and health-promoting behavior.
Also the studies by Chatterji and Markowitz (2005), Chatterji and Markowitz (2012),
and Guertzgen and Hank (2018) document the causal relationship of parental leave on
maternal health. Furthermore, several public health studies document the correlation
between maternity leave and mother’s health as extensively summarized by Staehelin
et al. (2007), Aitken et al. (2015), and Andres et al. (2016).
I contribute to this literature in various dimensions: I am the first to study increases
and reductions in parental leave duration in one setting. This allows me to look at asym-
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metries and to also explore the health gradient with respect to parental leave duration.
Furthermore, I can combine all three reforms and, thus, study maternal health prior to
birth and up to 17 years after birth. This allows me to understand the transition from an
absence of significant effects in the short-run, to very large effects in the long-run. The
very detailed data set that I am using also contains new outcome variables compared to
the previous literature. I can analyze very precise outcome measures both in the inpa-
tient as well as in the outpatient sector which are reported by the doctors themselves
to the health insurance fund. This helps in understanding mechanisms that drive the
self-reported health measures, which were mostly used in the previous literature.
Finally, my study is also closely related to the literature on the evaluation of parental
leave policies and other outcomes, such as child development and maternal labor mar-
ket outcomes as recently reviewed by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) and Rossin-Slater
(2018).1 All of these margins have to be taken into account by policy makers in order to
find the optimal parental leave duration.
Understanding the relationship between maternal health and parental leave duration
helps to guide policy makers. Showing that parental leave can actually be too long is
of high policy relevance as parental leave is expensive for the society. Furthermore, the
dependency of optimal parental leave length and characteristics of the newborn could be
incorporated in future family policies, as well.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. I first start by describing the institutional
setting where I both explain the Austrian family policy system and the Austrian health
care system. In Section 1.3, I describe the data and in Section 1.4 the empirical method.
1The same Austrian reforms that I use in this study are also used in the following studies which
evaluate other outcomes: Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) and Lalive et al. (2013), for example, study the
effect on maternal labor market outcomes and fertility. Danzer and Lavy (2018) and Danzer et al. (2017)
focus on cognitive outcomes of the affected children. More general, maternal labor market outcomes
are also studied by Berger et al. (2005); Baker and Milligan (2008a); Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck (2014)
and child development is also studied by Ruhm (2000); Berger et al. (2005); Tanaka (2005); Baker and
Milligan (2010); Liu and Skans (2010); Rasmussen (2010); Rossin (2011); Dustmann and Scho¨nberg
(2012); Carneiro et al. (2015); Dahl et al. (2016).
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Section 1.5 presents the results. I start by showing the baseline results for all three
reforms. I then look more deeply at the dynamics, analyze heterogeneous effects, conduct
several sensitivity analyses, summarize the health gradient, and study subsequent reforms.
A conclusion follows in Section 1.6.
1.2 Institutional Background
In this section, I first describe the Austrian family policy system and especially the three
reforms on parental leave duration that will be exploited in this paper. Then, I shortly
discuss the Austrian health care system.
1.2.1 Austrian Family Policy System
Family policies have a long history in Austria. Traditionally, Austria’s child care is orga-
nized via a familialistic approach with relatively little professional child care institutions
available (Do¨rfler and Blum, 2014). This led to giving a lot of value to the families them-
selves and to protecting pregnant women early on. Pregnant employed women were not
allowed to work during the first four weeks after giving birth, while getting a financial
compensation during this time period as early as 1888. The next 100 years were followed
by many changes: introducing paid and mandatory pre-birth leave, extending paid and
mandatory maternity leave, and introducing initially unpaid, ultimately paid compulsory
leave up to the first birthday of the child.
Table 1.1 gives an overview of the most recent reforms in the Austrian parental leave
system. In the following, I will describe in more detail the three reforms that occurred
from 1st of July 1990 to 1st of July 2000, as they will be exploited in the empirical
strategy.
Up to 30th of June 1990, mothers were entitled to eight weeks both pre- and post-
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Table 1.1: Overview Austrian Parental Leave Reforms
Time period duration benefits
(in months) (in e/ month)
until Jun 1990 12 340
Jul 1990–Jun 1996 24 340
Jul 1996–Jun 2000 18 (+6) 340
Jul 2000–Dec 2007 30 (+6) 340
Jan 2008–Dec 2009 30 (+6) 436
20 (+4) 624
15 (+3) 800
starting in Jan 2010 30 (+6) 436
20 (+4) 624
15 (+3) 800
12 (+2) 1000
12 (+2) 80% of last income
Notes: The information in this Table is based on Do¨rfler and Blum
(2014). The months highlighted in parenthesis in Column (2) refer
to those that are additionally and exclusively available to the second
parent.
birth mandatory maternity leave, during which they got the full wage which they earned
in the last quarter prior to giving birth. After mandatory leave, eligible mothers could
choose to go on compulsory leave which lasted at maximum up to the first birthday of the
child. Mothers were paid a flat benefit (roughly e 340 per month) and were guaranteed
job protection. First-time mothers over the age of 25 were eligible for compulsory leave
if they had worked for at least 52 weeks in the 2 years preceding birth. The eligibility
criteria is shorter for younger mothers and higher-order births.
As of 1st of July 1990, compulsory leave got extended up to the second birthday of
the child and was defined as parental leave, so that fathers could take up to 6 months
of the full parental leave duration. This policy reform was a result of parliamentary
procedural requests which wanted to introduce paternal leave. Due to the flat benefit
structure almost no fathers were taking up parental leave, which resulted in an increase
of maternal leave from 1 to 2 years.
Out of budgetary constraints, six of the available 24 months of parental leave were
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exclusively reserved for fathers for births that occurred after 1st of July 1996. This
essentially reduced maternal leave from 2 to 1.5 years, leaving the flat benefit structure
and job protection unchanged. As of 1st of July 2000, parental leave got extended to
36 months (reserving six months to fathers) in a broad reform, which changed the focus
from employed mothers to all mothers. This reform was implemented in 2002, but was
retroactively put in place for all employed mothers that gave birth after 1st of July 2000.
Thus comparing employed mothers who gave birth before 30th of June 2000 versus after,
leads to a difference in parental leave duration of 1 year, increasing it from 18 to 30 months
available to mothers.
More recently, parents were given the opportunity to choose from a set of options,
which combine different leave duration with flat benefit schemes. The last reform in 2010,
also added a relatively short parental leave option with benefits that are depending on
previous income. This option was specifically designed toward fathers to make leave more
attractive in terms of monetary compensation.
1.2.2 Austrian Health Care System
Austria’s health insurance system is organized as a Bismarck model, characterized by
universal health care coverage financed jointly by employers and employees. Depending
on occupation and place of residence, individuals are insured with 1 out of 9 regional
health insurance funds. This mandatory health insurance, based on employment and
residency, leaves no choice for individuals with respect to the provider and the insurance
package. The Upper Austrian Sickness Fund covers all inpatient and outpatient health
services free of charge and the health care system is of high quality. Patients are free to
consult a medical specialist, but an initial visit to a general practitioner for a referral to
a specialist is recommended.
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1.3 Data
My empirical analysis utilizes three separate administrative data sets: The Austrian Social
Security Database (ASSD), the data from the Statutory Health Insurance Fund (SHIF)
of Upper Austria, and the Austrian Birth Register (ABR). The social security database
includes information on a daily basis on the full working history of the universe of private
sector employees, birth events and parental leave spells.2 The data also contain informa-
tion on individual characteristics, such as the gender and age, and on job characteristics,
such as general occupation classification and yearly earnings per employer. Based on an
individual identifier the data can be linked to health outcomes for private sector employees
residing in the state of Upper Austria from 1998 to 2007.3 The data set includes informa-
tion on all covered health services, such as health care utilization in the outpatient sector
(i.e. doctor visits and prescriptions) and diagnoses in the inpatient sector. Finally, I com-
plement these data with additional information on maternal characteristics at the time of
birth (such as her education, marital status, and religion), the child’s health (gestational
length and birth weight), and additional birth characteristics (birth order and mode of
delivery) from a matching procedure with the Austrian Birth Register.
In order to analyze the parental leave reforms and the effect on health, I consider the
following outcome measures:
1. Outpatient health-care expenditures. Costs for all consultations with doctors and
specifically general practitioners (GPs) and prescribed medical drugs from 1998 to
2007 are collected and measured in 2000 e .
2. Prescriptions. Information on prescription does not only include the financial costs
but also the type of medication according to the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical
2The main collection purpose of this data is to document an employee’s working history in order to
calculate old age social security benefits.
3Upper Austria is one out of nine regions in Austria. It is with one sixth of Austria’s total population
the third most populous state.
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(ATC) Classification System. With the help of this pharmaceutical coding system,
I create dummy variables for ever having consumed analgesics, antidepressants,
general nervous system medication, and cardiovascular system medication.
3. Days of hospitalizations. Each inpatient hospital visit is individually recorded in
the data and the amount of overnight hospital stays is reported.
4. Inpatient diagnoses. The detailed reason for hospitalization is classified according to
the ninth revision of the International Classification of Diseases and Related Health
Problems (ICD-9). The causes are aggregated into 18 broad categories of which
I will put a special emphasis on mental disorders, depression, and diseases of the
circulatory system. These choices are guided by the previous literature on where to
expect long-term effects of parental leave.
5. Sick leave and Mortality. Certain health outcomes, such as sick leave and mortality
are recorded in the ASSD and, therefore, available for all mothers in my sample
and not only those residing in Upper Austria. More specifically on the sick leave
information; only sickness benefits above three days can be observed.4
I use accumulated annual measures at each point in time and at the end of the ob-
served time window to have less noisy measures for health care expenditures, and to get
information about health dynamics. In my baseline results, I only report estimates for the
last point in time, i.e. accumulated outcomes over nine years.5 Accumulated measures
for diagnoses and prescriptions are coded such as ever diagnosed and, therefore, turn one
in the first year of occurrence and stay one thereafter. All other measures (e.g. costs and
4Absences below three days do not have to be reported and are, therefore, not reliably recorded. For
more information on sickness benefits see Kuhn et al. (2009).
5As health outcomes are only available from 1998 to 2007 and as I estimate a difference-in-differences
(DiD) regression discontinuity design (which will be explained in the next section), I loose 1 year of
information for each individual. This is the results of the DiD because I want mothers to be comparable
which means to have the same amount of years since giving birth. As an example, for the 1990 reform
sample, I start to observe mothers eight years past giving birth, while I only start observing them nine
years past giving birth for the 1989 sample. Therefore, I have to drop the first year for the 1990 sample
and the last year for the 1989 sample.
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days of hospitalizations) are accumulated and entail the full information on the amount.
This means that in case of the 1990 (1996/2000) reform, I will show results for mothers
who gave birth to their first child 16 (10/6) years ago. As health outcomes change over
the life cycle, the results are not directly comparable across reform samples.
In the main analysis, I restrict my sample to first births and to those mothers that
can be observed over the entire time window from 1998 to 2007. There are several reasons
why mothers could leave the sample — mothers can become self-employed or mothers can
move into one of the other regions in Austria.
Descriptives. Summary statistics for the described variables are presented in Table
1.2. The first column presents means and standard deviations for my main sample. The
second to fourth columns restrict the attention to each sample used for one out of the
three specific reforms. Column 2, for example, consists of all mothers giving birth in 1990
as well as the pre-reform year 1989 due to the RDD-DiD design which will be explained
in more detail in the next section. Columns 3–4 are defined accordingly.
Mother’s expenditures across the samples are not entirely comparable because the
time since birth is shorter for more recent reform samples and, thus, mothers tend to
be younger even with increasing age at time of birth. Additionally, in the third reform
sample mothers are giving birth during the observation period and, therefore, tend to
have more days of hospitalizations.
The average mother in the 1990/1996/2000 reform sample generated e 2,423/2,371/
2,354 of accumulated outpatient health expenditures at the end of the observation window
and spent 8.23/7.59/15.13 days in hospital. 32.0/28.8/25.0 percent of mothers are getting
prescriptions for diseases of the nervous system and sense organs, and 8.1/7.5/6.7 percent
of mothers are hospitalized for mental health issues. General trends in motherhood can
15
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics
Full sample 1989-1990 1995-1996 1999-2000
sample sample sample
Cumulated outpatient costs 2,383.1632 2,422.887 2,371.067 2,354.290
(3,146.199) (3,612.154) (3,252.893) (2,391.621)
Cumulated GP costs 281.231 314.097 271.462 257.068
(458.955) (606.927) (372.244) (350.763)
Cumulated medication costs 578.893 665.960 631.638 424.966
(2,497.664) (2,753.755) (2,750.641) (1,806.091)
Cumulated days of hospitalizations 10.144 8.227 7.589 15.126
(5.017) (5.575) (4.948) (4.425)
Mental disorders 0.075 0.081 0.075 0.067
Depression 0.065 0.072 0.065 0.059
Antidepressants 0.150 0.172 0.150 0.126
Nervous system medicaton 0.287 0.320 0.288 0.250
Analgesics 0.130 0.142 0.138 0.108
Circulatory system diseases 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.012
Cardiovasc. system medication 0.074 0.098 0.072 0.050
Maternal age at birth 27.333 26.180 27.518 28.362
(4.854) (4.663) (4.688) (4.971)
High-wage at birth 0.551 0.549 0.544 0.562
Married at birth 0.702 0.742 0.705 0.655
Low birth weight baby 0.040 0.040 0.037 0.042
Preterm birth 0.037 0.033 0.038 0.041
Caesarean section 0.121 0.107 0.137
Mental disorder pre-birth 0.014 0.014
Observations 39,858 13,313 14,162 12,383
Notes: The full sample covers all births that occur in the reform (1990, 1996, 2000) and the preceding
non-reform (1989, 1995, 1999) years in the months from April to September (a bandwidth of three
months chosen in the main analysis). Columns 2–4 restrict the sample to each one of the reform and the
preceding non-reform year. Standard errors are shown in parentheses if necessary. Due to data availability
Caesarean sections are only available starting from 1995 and Mental disorders pre-birth starting from
1999.
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also be observed: Maternal age at first birth increases from 26.2 years in the 1990 reform
sample to 28.4 years in the 2000 reform sample; and mothers are less likely to be married
(65.5 percent) in the last sample. The health of the newborn is relatively constant over
time (roughly 3–4 percent of babies are born preterm or with low birth weight).
1.4 Empirical Method
In this paper, I assess the average causal effect of duration of parental leave on maternal
health in the short- to long-run. To do this, the estimation strategy relies on exogenous
variation in leave duration based on the three described reforms. Namely, parental leave
increased by 1 year to 2 years for mothers giving birth after 1st of July 1990. This was
partially reversed to 1.5 years in July 1996 and got extended again to 2.5 years in July
2000. Figure 1.1 depicts how these changes in leave duration affected actual behavior, i.e.
the months on parental leave. Black dotted lines describe reform years and gray dashed
lines depict non-reform years preceding a reform. In all three reform years, mothers who
give birth in July show a significant jump in months on parental leave. For example,
mothers who gave birth in July 1990 versus June 1990 stay on leave for an average of
21 versus 11 months. July 1996 mothers are five months less on leave than June 1996
mothers, and July 2000 mothers stay on leave for more than 27 months versus 18 months
as the June 2000 mothers. In non-reform years, there is no discontinuity.
This sharp discontinuous jump in leave duration at the policy reform thresholds al-
lows me to employ a regression discontinuity design. However, as systematic differences
in maternal characteristics by season of birth have been shown to exist (Currie and
Schwandt, 2013), I will estimate a difference-in-differences regression discontinuity de-
sign (DiD-RDD). This approach allows to control for differences in outcomes between
mothers who gave birth after versus before the reforms in July that are unrelated to
17
Figure 1.1: Discontinuity in Actual Parental Leave Duration
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are, therefore, stable across the year. Vertical black lines inform about the month in which the policy
changes were implemented.
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the reform itself. I estimate the following equation separately for each reform sample on
eligible women using a bandwidth of three months:6
Yit = β0 + β1Ti ∗ reformi + β2Ti + β3reformi + β4Ri ∗ reformi + β5Ri
+ β6Ti ∗Ri ∗ reformi + β7Ti ∗Ri + i,
(1.1)
with Yit the health outcomes of mother i, t years after giving birth to her child; Ti
an indicator for giving birth after the policy change (such that T=1 for July-September
mothers and T=0 for April-June mothers); Ri the number of months from the policy re-
form (the so called rating variable, in order to allow for separate trends on each side of the
cutoff); and reformi a dummy for a reform year (such that reformi=0 in a pre-reform year
and reformi=1 in a reform year). Here, β1 identifies the net effect of changing parental
leave length controlling for the difference between the outcomes of mothers who give birth
in the second half versus the first half of a reform year relative to the difference of these
mothers in a non-reform year preceding the policy change.
Identification. There are three identifying assumptions in this setting: 1) There has
to be a sharp treatment discontinuity at the cutoff (Lee and Lemieux, 2010a); 2) Instead,
there should be no discontinuity in potential outcomes at the cutoff (Lee and Lemieux,
2010a); 3) Due to adding the differences-in-differences structure, I have to assume that
month-of-birth effects do not vary across years. Assumption (1) is fulfilled as shown in
Figure 1.1. There are standard procedures to validate the intestable assumption (2).
I test for discontinuities in non-outcome variables, which I report in Table A.1 in the
Appendix7 and conclude that as these variables evolve relatively smoothly across the
6I estimate local linear regressions with a rectangular kernel (as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux
(2008)), cluster standard errors by birth month (as suggested by Lee and Card (2008)), and choose the
bandwidth implementing a cross-validation method (as recommended by Imbens and Lemieux (2008)).
7All following Figures and Tables denoted by A are reported in the Appendix: Chapter 1.
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cutoff, RD estimates are likely to generate consistent estimates.8 Assumption (3) seems
relatively mild and reasonable, as I am only using the pre-reform year. It is very unlikely
that month-of-birth effects change over such a short time horizon.
1.5 Results
In this section, I start by reporting the baseline results. Based on these estimates, I
focus on more specific causes and prescriptions. As I can exploit the panel structure of
the data and follow mothers over time, I report health dynamics to understand how the
baseline results evolve over time and at what time after birth significant effects emerge.
These results will be completed by a heterogeneity analysis and several robustness checks
including placebo estimations, playing with different bandwidth choices, and adding some
health measures from the ASSD sample which are available for all Austrian mothers.
1.5.1 Baseline Results
I present estimates of each reform on different general maternal health outcomes in Table
1.3. The general health outcomes that I consider are: The 9-years accumulated health
costs in the total outpatient sector, the costs when visiting a general practitioner, the costs
concerning prescribed medications, and the accumulated number of days of hospitaliza-
tions at the end of the observation period. The RDD-DiD estimates, based on Equation
(1.1), report the difference in health outcomes for mothers giving birth to their first child
after the policy change. These estimates are unrelated to seasonality, as I difference out
seasonality effects by including the pre-reform year. Standard errors are clustered at the
level of the running variable as suggested by Lee and Card (2008).
I start by discussing the results for the reform in 1990, the year where parental leave
8Some of the estimates show a significant jump around the cutoff. This jump is usually very small in
absolute size and thus unlikely to bias the results.
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Table 1.3: Estimates on General Health Outcomes
Dependent variable
Outpatient
costs
GP
costs
Medication
costs
Days of
hospitalizations
1990 Reform
RDD-DiD −290.6* 41.44 −337.4*** 2.764**
(140.2) (36.45) (70.27) (0.817)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2422.887 314.097 665.960 8.227
Observations 13,313 13,313 13,313 13,313
1996 Reform
RDD-DiD −275.3 −11.02 −350.8* 0.520
(170.2) (21.89) (163.0) (0.765)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2371.067 271.462 631.638 7.589
Observations 14,162 14,162 14,162 14,162
2000 Reform
RDD-DiD 255.1** −36.31*** 171.6 −3.718**
(96.15) (5.540) (91.91) (1.260)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2354.290 257.068 424.966 15.126
Observations 12,383 12,383 12,383 12,383
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table provides parameter estimates for the coefficient β1 of Equation (1.1).
Each reform is individually estimated. The sample includes all mothers within a bandwidth
of three months in a reform year and the preceding non-reform year, to control for season-
ality around the policy cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the running
variable. Health outcomes are accumulated over time up to 2007, so that birth occurred
17/11/7 years ago for the reform in 1990/1996/2000.
got extended by 1 year to 2 years. Outcomes are accumulated over the 9-year window
and health outcomes of mothers are evaluated 17 years after giving birth. GP costs are
not significantly affected by the reform. Generally, the two strongest cost drivers of sig-
nificantly reduced outpatient costs are the GP and the medication costs. For the 1990
reform, medication costs are significantly lower for post-reform mothers. The point es-
timate of e -337.4 is very large in absolute values. At the mean, this corresponds to
reducing costs related to prescribed medication by half. This positive health impact by
reducing medication costs is partly offset by the significant increase in days of hospital-
izations. Post-reform mothers spend 2.8 days more in a hospital, which corresponds to
an increase of 34 percent, at the mean. As in the case of hospitalizations, costs are not
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reported in the data, these two effects cannot directly be compared. Thus, there seems
to be a trade-off between better outpatient and worse inpatient health outcomes.
The 1996 reform, which decreased parental leave from 2 years to 1.5 years for mothers,
leads to a marginally significant reduction in the outpatient health outcomes. The weakly
significant effect of reducing medication costs by e 350.8, is again non-negligible. The
effect on days of hospitalizations is both very small and not significant. These outcomes
are measured 12 years after giving birth. Therefore, estimates cannot be directly compared
to the 1990 reform, where outcomes are measured 16 years post-birth. Later, when I
directly compare the reforms with each other, I adjust sample windows to overlapping
event windows.
Lastly, in the lower part of Table 1.3, I report RDD-DID estimates for the 2000 reform.
This reform increased parental leave again by 1 year to a total duration of 2.5 years. This
reform significantly increases overall outpatient costs by e 255.1 — an increase of around
11 percent, at the mean. This overall increase of total outpatient costs is a combination of
significantly decreased GP costs by e -36.31 and a non-significant increase of medication
costs by e 171.6. In line with the 1990 reform, also for the 2000 reform outpatient health
outcomes move in the opposite direction than inpatient health outcomes. Specifically, the
estimate on days of hospitalizations opposes the increase in health costs in the outpatient
sector with a decline of 3.7 days, a reduction of 25 percent, at the mean.
Tables 1.4–1.5 report more specific health outcomes. Table 1.4 shows estimates on
mental health outcomes both in the inpatient (mental disorders and depression) as well
as in the outpatient (antidepressants, nervous system medication, and analgesics) sector
and Table 1.5 looks more specifically at cardiovascular health outcomes, such as general
hospital diagnoses categorized as circulatory system diseases and prescriptions related to
the cardiovascular system. Both Tables are structured as Table 1.3.
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Table 1.4: Estimates on Mental Health Outcomes
Dependent variable
Mental
disorders Depression
Anti-
depressants
Nervous
system med. Analgesics
1990 Reform
RDD-DiD 0.0283** 0.0187 −0.00374 −0.00855 0.0292***
(0.0105) (0.0121) (0.0201) (0.00925) (0.00555)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.081 0.072 0.172 0.320 0.142
Observations 13,313 13,313 13,313 13,313 13,313
1996 Reform
RDD-DiD −0.0250* −0.0174 −0.0127 0.00631 −0.0276**
(0.0123) (0.0112) (0.0164) (0.0211) (0.00994)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.075 0.065 0.150 0.288 0.138
Observations 14,162 14,162 14,162 14,162 14,162
2000 Reform
RDD-DiD 0.0104 0.00418 0.0260* 0.0702*** 0.0504***
(0.00834) (0.00804) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.00918)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.067 0.059 0.126 0.250 0.108
Observations 12,383 12,383 12,383 12,383 12,383
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table provides parameter estimates for the coefficient β1 of Equation (1.1). Each reform
is individually estimated. The sample includes all mothers within a bandwidth of three months in a
reform year and the preceding non-reform year, to control for seasonality around the policy cutoff.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the running variable. Health outcomes are accumulated
over time up to 2007, so that birth occurred 17/11/7 years ago for the reform in 1990/1996/2000.
For estimates on mental health outcomes, the pattern seems to direct toward longer
leave being harmful for maternal mental health. Namely, for the 1990 reform, there are
two significant estimates: One on the probability of ever being diagnosed with a mental
disorder and the other one on the likelihood of being prescribed an analgesics. The
estimate on mental disorders is 0.028 and the one on analgesics is 0.030. As such, they
both are positive and therefore tend toward a negative health impact of the 1990 reform,
which increased parental leave by 1 year. Contrary, the 1996 reform which decreased
leave by six months decreases the probability of analgesics prescriptions by 0.028 and
the one on being diagnosed with a mental disorder by 0.025. The 2000 reform, which
increases parental leave by 1 year again to 2.5 years, increases antidepressants by 0.026,
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Table 1.5: Estimates on Cardiovascular Health Outcomes
Dependent variable
Circulatory system
diseases
Cardiovascular system
medication
1990 Reform
RDD-DiD −0.00404 0.000722
(0.00303) (0.0160)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.014 0.098
Observations 13,313 13,313
1996 Reform
RDD-DiD 0.0128*** −0.0122
(0.00316) (0.00868)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.013 0.072
Observations 14,162 14,162
2000 Reform
RDD-DiD 0.00298 0.00521
(0.00484) (0.00624)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.012 0.050
Observations 12,383 12,383
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table provides parameter estimates for the coefficient β1 of Equa-
tion (1.1). Each reform is individually estimated. The sample includes all
mothers within a bandwidth of three months in a reform year and the preced-
ing non-reform year, to control for seasonality around the policy cutoff. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the level of the running variable. Health outcomes
are accumulated over time up to 2007, so that birth occurred 17/11/7 years
ago for the reform in 1990/1996/2000.
nervous system medications by 0.070, and analgesics by 0.050. These effects are large in
magnitude, as they can be interpreted as an increase of 21 percent, 28 percent, and 47
percent, at the mean, respectively. Summarizing the mental health outcomes, one can
clearly say that it is the outpatient sector for mental health outcomes that reacts to a
change in parental leave duration. Longer leave deteriorates maternal mental health with
more prescriptions for the nervous system and analgesics.
For cardiovascular health outcomes, which are reported in Table 1.5, only one point
estimate is significant. For the 1996 reform, which decreased parental leave by six months
to 1.5 years, there is a positive estimate on the probability of ever being hospitalized with
24
a disease of the circulatory system of 0.013. This effect is contrary to what is observed
with mental health outcomes, as in this case the shorter leave leads to worse inpatient
health.
Overall, also having in light the main results reported in Table 1.3, there seems to
be a general trade-off between inpatient and outpatient health, which also gets confirmed
when looking closer at the mental health and cardiovascular health outcomes.
As a next step, it is interesting to see whether the inpatient and outpatient health
outcomes diverge from the early beginning on or whether there are other observable
dynamics. In the next section, I look more specifically at how these outcomes evolve over
time.
1.5.2 Health Dynamics
Figure 1.2 reports the dynamics of the general health outcomes over time and shows an
estimate for each observed year. Results are shown by each point in time accumulated up
to this moment to see whether effects happen quickly after giving birth or if they increase
over time. Thus, the last dot in each subfigure corresponds to the estimate reported in
the Tables before. Additionally, confidence intervals are shown with dashed lines.
Panel A reports the results for the 1990 reform. Due to the availability of the data,
one can observe accumulated health outcomes from 9 to 17 years after giving birth. It can
be seen that the negative effect on outpatient costs mostly driven by the medication costs
starts right at the beginning of the observation period and increases until 17 years after
giving birth. The effect on the inpatient health outcome, measured with days hospitalized,
follows the same logic but in the other direction. Already 9 years after giving birth,
mothers who were on leave for 1 more year, are more likely to be hospitalized and this
estimate increases over time and starts to become significant 13 years after giving birth.
25
F
ig
u
re
1
.2
:
H
ea
lt
h
D
y
n
a
m
ic
s
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
1
9
9
0
R
e
fo
rm
−
60
0
−
40
0
−
20
00
20
0
point estimate
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
ye
ar
s 
sin
ce
 b
irt
h
N
ot
e:
 P
re
−r
ef
or
m
 m
ea
n 
at
 e
nd
 o
f o
bs
. p
er
io
d:
   
   
 2
,4
23
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
du
ra
tio
n:
 1
 y
ea
r −
> 
2 
ye
ar
s
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 O
ut
pa
tie
nt
 C
os
ts
: R
ef
or
m
 1
99
0
−
5005010
0
point estimate
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
ye
ar
s 
sin
ce
 b
irt
h
N
ot
e:
 P
re
−r
ef
or
m
 m
ea
n 
at
 e
nd
 o
f o
bs
. p
er
io
d:
   
   
   
31
4
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
du
ra
tio
n:
 1
 y
ea
r −
> 
2 
ye
ar
s
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 G
P 
Co
st
s:
 R
ef
or
m
 1
99
0
−
60
0
−
40
0
−
20
00
point estimate
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
ye
ar
s 
sin
ce
 b
irt
h
N
ot
e:
 P
re
−r
ef
or
m
 m
ea
n 
at
 e
nd
 o
f o
bs
. p
er
io
d:
   
   
   
66
6
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
du
ra
tio
n:
 1
 y
ea
r −
> 
2 
ye
ar
s
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 M
ed
ica
tio
n 
Co
st
s:
 R
ef
or
m
 1
99
0
−
2024
point estimate
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
ye
ar
s 
sin
ce
 b
irt
h
N
ot
e:
 P
re
−r
ef
or
m
 m
ea
n 
at
 e
nd
 o
f o
bs
. p
er
io
d:
   
   
   
  8
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
du
ra
tio
n:
 1
 y
ea
r −
> 
2 
ye
ar
s
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 H
os
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n 
(in
 da
ys
): R
efo
rm
 19
90
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
1
9
9
6
R
e
fo
rm
−
60
0
−
40
0
−
20
00
point estimate
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
ye
ar
s 
sin
ce
 b
irt
h
N
ot
e:
 P
re
−r
ef
or
m
 m
ea
n 
at
 e
nd
 o
f o
bs
. p
er
io
d:
   
   
 2
,3
71
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
du
ra
tio
n:
 2
 y
ea
rs
 −
> 
1.
5 
ye
ar
s
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 O
ut
pa
tie
nt
 C
os
ts
: R
ef
or
m
 1
99
6
−
50050
point estimate
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
ye
ar
s 
sin
ce
 b
irt
h
N
ot
e:
 P
re
−r
ef
or
m
 m
ea
n 
at
 e
nd
 o
f o
bs
. p
er
io
d:
   
   
   
27
1
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
du
ra
tio
n:
 2
 y
ea
rs
 −
> 
1.
5 
ye
ar
s
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 G
P 
Co
st
s:
 R
ef
or
m
 1
99
6
−
60
0
−
40
0
−
20
00
point estimate
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
ye
ar
s 
sin
ce
 b
irt
h
N
ot
e:
 P
re
−r
ef
or
m
 m
ea
n 
at
 e
nd
 o
f o
bs
. p
er
io
d:
   
   
   
63
2
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
du
ra
tio
n:
 2
 y
ea
rs
 −
> 
1.
5 
ye
ar
s
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 M
ed
ica
tio
n 
Co
st
s:
 R
ef
or
m
 1
99
6
−
202
point estimate
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
ye
ar
s 
sin
ce
 b
irt
h
N
ot
e:
 P
re
−r
ef
or
m
 m
ea
n 
at
 e
nd
 o
f o
bs
. p
er
io
d:
   
   
   
  8
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
du
ra
tio
n:
 2
 y
ea
rs
 −
> 
1.
5 
ye
ar
s
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 H
os
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n 
(in
 da
ys
): R
efo
rm
 19
96
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
2
0
0
0
R
e
fo
rm
0
20
0
40
0
point estimate
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
ye
ar
s 
sin
ce
 b
irt
h
N
ot
e:
 P
re
−r
ef
or
m
 m
ea
n 
at
 e
nd
 o
f o
bs
. p
er
io
d:
   
   
 2
,3
54
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
du
ra
tio
n:
 1
.5
 y
ea
rs
 −
> 
2.
5 
ye
ar
s
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 O
ut
pa
tie
nt
 C
os
ts
: R
ef
or
m
 2
00
0
−
40
−
200
point estimate
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
ye
ar
s 
sin
ce
 b
irt
h
N
ot
e:
 P
re
−r
ef
or
m
 m
ea
n 
at
 e
nd
 o
f o
bs
. p
er
io
d:
   
   
   
25
7
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
du
ra
tio
n:
 1
.5
 y
ea
rs
 −
> 
2.
5 
ye
ar
s
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 G
P 
Co
st
s:
 R
ef
or
m
 2
00
0
−
10
00
10
0
20
0
30
0
point estimate
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
ye
ar
s 
sin
ce
 b
irt
h
N
ot
e:
 P
re
−r
ef
or
m
 m
ea
n 
at
 e
nd
 o
f o
bs
. p
er
io
d:
   
   
   
42
5
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
du
ra
tio
n:
 1
.5
 y
ea
rs
 −
> 
2.
5 
ye
ar
s
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 M
ed
ica
tio
n 
Co
st
s:
 R
ef
or
m
 2
00
0
−
6
−
4
−
20
point estimate
−
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
ye
ar
s 
sin
ce
 b
irt
h
N
ot
e:
 P
re
−r
ef
or
m
 m
ea
n 
at
 e
nd
 o
f o
bs
. p
er
io
d:
   
   
   
 1
5
Pa
re
nt
al
 le
av
e 
du
ra
tio
n:
 1
.5
 y
ea
rs
 −
> 
2.
5 
ye
ar
s
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 H
os
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n 
(in
 da
ys
): R
efo
rm
 20
00
N
o
te
s:
T
h
is
F
ig
u
re
sh
ow
s
p
oi
n
t
es
ti
m
at
es
fr
om
es
ti
m
a
ti
n
g
E
q
u
a
ti
o
n
(1
.1
)
o
n
d
iff
er
en
t
a
cc
u
m
u
la
te
d
h
ea
lt
h
o
u
tc
o
m
es
.
E
a
ch
d
o
t
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
se
p
ar
at
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
on
ac
cu
m
u
la
ti
n
g
th
e
h
ea
lt
h
ou
tc
o
m
e
u
p
to
th
is
p
o
in
t
in
ti
m
e.
D
a
sh
ed
li
n
es
re
p
o
rt
9
5
p
er
ce
n
t
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
in
te
rv
a
ls
.
26
The dynamics for the 1996 reform are reported in Panel B. Mothers both pre- and
post-reform do not differ in their likelihood of being hospitalized, but health costs in
the outpatient sector show different patterns. Mothers in the post-reform sample, who
spent on average six months less on parental leave than pre-reform mothers, have less
expenditures on general outpatient costs and especially medication costs. This effect is
significant already three years after giving birth, which is the first year where mothers
can be observed in the panel. The effect is especially precisely estimated from three to six
years after giving birth, but continues to increase in absolute size in the years thereafter.
Finally, for the 2000 reform as reported in Panel C, one can observe mothers already
1 year before giving birth. Importantly, one has to keep in mind that pre-reform versus
post-reform mothers are generally on leave for 1.5 versus 2.5 years, respectively. As such,
it is interesting to see, whether the health outcomes diverge while post-reform mothers
are still on leave and pre-reform mothers started working already, i.e. in the years 1.5
to 2.5 after giving birth. This does not seem to be the case. Focusing on the outpatient
and medication costs, which have the strongest effects in absolute terms, one can clearly
see, that health outcomes only start to diverge five years after giving birth and then
constantly increase up to 7 years after giving birth. For these outcomes, in line with the
RDD argument, these mothers also do not differ pre-birth. For the days hospitalized,
instead, mothers differ already pre-birth which makes the interpretation of the estimate
on days hospitalized more difficult. The same is true for GP costs, but these are very
small in absolute size.
The general take-away from looking at the dynamics is that health effects accumulate
over time. Only looking at the time period in which some mothers are still on leave
and others started working does not fully capture all the health effects of parental leave
reforms. This can also explain the effects that have already been found in the literature.
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E.g. Baker and Milligan (2008b) focused on health outcomes 1 year after birth and could
not detect any significant effects. However, this may just have been a too short time
window. Instead, the strong and positive effects of longer leave reported by Butikofer
et al. (2018) at the age of 40 may capture the fact, that the effects on maternal health
increase over time and may even be higher at older ages. Mothers analyzed with the 1990
reform, for example, are on average 43 years old in my analysis. Even these mothers still
show a positive slope of the health effects, suggesting that health effects are still increasing
at that age.
1.5.3 Heterogeneity
Next, I examine whether the effects of the reform varied with characteristics of the moth-
ers (wage or marital status), the health of the newborn (born with low birth weight or
preterm), the delivery method (Caesarean section) for the two latter reforms, and pre-
birth mental health for the 2000 reform. Results are reported in Tables 1.6–1.8.
Specifically, I augment Equation (1.1) by interacting all parameters with one of the
heterogeneous subgroups and report only the parameters of interest, i.e. the effect of the
policy change in a reform year and the interaction term. The interaction term reports the
additional effect (added to the baseline RDD-DiD estimate) for the stated heterogeneous
group, i.e. for high-wage mothers in the first panel.
Table 1.6 reports the effects for the 1990 reform. The results by wage show a clear pat-
tern. While all significant effects show better health outcomes (negative point estimates)
for low-wage mothers, the interaction term for these outcomes is positive and significant.
Additionally, in absolute size, the interaction term is larger than the effect for low-wage
mothers, so that the overall effect on maternal health for high-wage mothers is positive
but insignificant. Thus, the additional year of parental leave is beneficial for low-wage
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mothers only. This is not surprising, as high-wage mothers might find it easier to arrange
child care and probably also benefit more from working due to higher wages. The same
argumentation carries on when looking at the sign of the effect for married versus unmar-
ried mothers. Unmarried mothers benefit substantially more from longer parental leave
than married mothers.
Table 1.6: Heterogeneous Effects: 1990 Reform
Dependent variable
Outpatient
costs
GP
costs
Medication
costs
Days of
hospitalizations
High-wage vs low-wage
RDD-DiD −984.4** 0.948 −887.1*** 4.064*
(318.6) (64.01) (170.4) (1.834)
Interaction high-wage 1175.3** 74.79 923.3*** −1.853
(306.1) (47.46) (188.1) (1.678)
Married vs unmarried
RDD-DiD −872.7*** −25.32*** −594.6** 1.910***
(189.6) (6.225) (169.4) (0.385)
Interaction married 787.1*** 91.14 349.7* 1.139
(67.36) (50.71) (155.2) (0.608)
Low birth weight baby vs normal birth weight baby
RDD-DiD −294.8 42.38 −334.8*** 2.197*
(155.6) (42.31) (66.82) (0.945)
Interaction LBWB −160.7 −24.78 −290.2 13.42**
(417.5) (214.1) (176.9) (4.819)
Preterm birth vs normal birth
RDD-DiD −259.1 39.71 −319.8** 3.074*
(187.7) (43.45) (99.26) (1.265)
Interaction preterm −1092.3 61.68 −626.0 −9.230
(1595.7) (250.7) (882.6) (16.61)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2422.887 314.097 665.960 8.227
Observations 13,313 13,313 13,313 13,313
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table provides parameter estimates for the coefficient β1 of Equation (1.1) and
an interaction with the stated heterogeneous group. The sample includes all mothers within a
bandwidth of three months in the reform year 1990 and the preceding non-reform year 1989,
to control for seasonality around the policy cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the level
of the running variable. Health outcomes are accumulated over time up to 2007, so that birth
occurred 17 years ago.
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Table 1.7: Heterogeneous Effects: 1996 Reform
Dependent variable
Outpatient
costs
GP
costs
Medication
costs
Days of
hospitalizations
High-wage vs low-wage
RDD-DiD −27.79 25.76 −272.3 5.028*
(340.1) (38.53) (181.4) (2.368)
Interaction high-wage −480.4 −66.61* −159.8 −7.914**
(584.1) (30.20) (385.5) (2.920)
Married vs unmarried
RDD-DiD −75.49 −14.48 −237.8 −0.942
(401.5) (37.87) (325.2) (2.125)
Interaction married −250.8 5.767 −140.1 2.298
(341.1) (30.84) (238.5) (2.649)
Low birth weight baby vs normal birth weight baby
RDD-DiD −445.4** −16.17 −488.2** 0.884
(158.2) (23.18) (136.9) (0.968)
Interaction LBWB 4502.1*** 154.5 3596.3*** −6.138*
(319.3) (88.92) (668.9) (2.798)
Preterm birth vs normal birth
RDD-DiD −286.7 −16.44 −344.3* 1.803
(148.1) (22.81) (147.7) (1.113)
Interaction preterm 304.8 136.4*** −173.4 −32.68***
(586.1) (14.57) (470.1) (7.756)
Caesarean section vs vaginal delivery
RDD-DiD −168.8 1.616 −298.6* 1.478*
(126.9) (16.83) (118.9) (0.660)
Interaction CS −1099.1* −127.9* −565.9 −9.916**
(446.1) (50.44) (526.1) (2.548)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2371.067 271.462 631.638 7.589
Observations 14,162 14,162 14,162 14,162
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table provides parameter estimates for the coefficient β1 of Equation (1.1) and
an interaction with the stated heterogeneous group. The sample includes all mothers within a
bandwidth of three months in the reform year 1996 and the preceding non-reform year 1995,
to control for seasonality around the policy cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the level
of the running variable. Health outcomes are accumulated over time up to 2007, so that birth
occurred 11 years ago.
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneous Effects: 2000 Reform
Dependent variable
Outpatient
costs
GP
costs
Medication
costs
Days of
hospitalizations
High-wage vs Low-wage
RDD-DiD 604.5*** 7.406 453.6*** −3.073
(119.1) (9.847) (76.14) (1.747)
Interaction high-wage −612.6*** −76.06*** −494.3*** −1.157
(101.2) (11.87) (53.68) (1.057)
Married vs unmarried
RDD-DiD 729.3** −50.47** 545.1* −4.367*
(214.7) (19.53) (236.1) (2.043)
Interaction married −724.6** 22.35 −573.5* 1.049
(185.5) (29.93) (223.2) (1.222)
Low birth weight baby vs normal birth weight baby
RDD-DiD 332.8** −21.96** 199.3* −2.752*
(103.6) (7.017) (97.60) (1.078)
Interaction LBWB −1693.7*** −314.6*** −610.9*** −21.03***
(130.8) (28.86) (127.8) (2.832)
Preterm birth vs normal birth
RDD-DiD 245.8* −30.06*** 152.6 −3.200**
(98.63) (4.181) (102.3) (0.982)
Interaction preterm 283.3** −143.7** 474.0 −9.274
(74.28) (51.27) (292.5) (4.953)
Caesarean section vs vaginal delivery
RDD-DiD 191.0** −25.46*** 100.4 −1.445
(64.34) (4.908) (63.63) (1.131)
Interaction CS 489.7 −82.64* 552.8* −14.74***
(389.3) (37.06) (236.9) (1.498)
Notes: This Table continues on the next page.
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Table 1.8 continued: Heterogeneous Effects: 2000 Reform
Dependent variable
Outpatient
costs
GP
costs
Medication
costs
Days of
hospitalizations
Mental disorder pre-birth vs healthy pre-birth
RDD-DiD 198.3* −40.94*** 161.7 −3.847**
(88.58) (4.999) (84.99) (1.118)
Interaction MDPB 3167.0*** 282.2*** 436.5 4.366
(361.7) (35.55) (541.8) (13.58)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2354.290 257.068 424.966 15.126
Observations 12,383 12,383 12,383 12,383
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table provides parameter estimates for the coefficient β1 of Equation (1.1)
and an interaction with the stated heterogeneous group. The sample includes all mothers
within a bandwidth of three months in the reform year 2000 and the preceding non-reform
year 1999, to control for seasonality around the policy cutoff. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the level of the running variable. Health outcomes are accumulated over time up
to 2007, so that birth occurred 7 years ago.
Next, I examine the effect of the 1990 reform by the health of the newborn. I create two
indicators; (1) if the child is born with less than 2,500 grams — which is defined as a low
birth weight baby and (2) if the child is born before the 37th week of gestation — which
determines a preterm birth.9 These two dummy variables potentially capture different
things. A preterm baby may well be mature enough to survive outside the mother’s body,
while a low birth weight baby may have spent up to 40 weeks in a mother’s womb but did
not grow enough. Thus, a low birth weight baby will generally be put in neonatal care to
gain weight. Unhealthy babies may demand an extra amount of maternal care which may
last into later childhood. As such, one would expect mothers from unhealthy babies to
benefit more from longer leave, which is partly what the point estimates confirm. Mothers
with unhealthy babies show overall a stronger decline in the cost health measures than
mothers with healthy babies. The interaction term is, though, never significant, which is
most likely the result of the small sample size for these subgroups: Roughly 3-4 percent
of all births are either low birth weight or preterm.
9Both thresholds of a low birth weight baby and a preterm birth are defined by the World Health
Organization.
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For the 1996 reform, results are reported in Table 1.7. Most of the point estimates are
generally not significant, but overall support the previous interpretations. While estimates
generally point toward a non-significant reduction of health costs, this effect is stronger
for high-wage and married mothers. The result for mothers with low birth weight babies
is very interesting. Mothers with healthy babies are facing lower costs (i.e. e -445.4 on
outpatient costs and e -488.2 on medication costs), but for mothers with unhealthy babies
the reduction in parental leave to 1.5 years is very harmful (i.e. +e 4502.1 on outpatient
costs and +e 3596.3 on medication costs). Thus, for mothers with babies who need some
extra care the reduction to shorter leave is also very stressful for mothers and, therefore,
decreases maternal health. Finally, as birth delivery methods are recorded from 1995
onward, I can also distinguish by Caesarean section. Generally, mothers who gave birth
via Caesarean section benefit more from shorter leave. This is at first surprising, as in
general mothers with a Caesarean section need more time to recover from giving birth.
However, in the Austrian case parental leave is initially already long enough so that this
usual mechanism is not playing a key role here.
In Table 1.8, I show heterogeneous effects for the 2000 reform. Long parental leave
almost exclusively shows to be beneficial for mothers with low birth weight babies. All
health measures become significantly reduced by a large amount. All other types of moth-
ers show deteriorated or unchanged health outcomes. While I can observe health measures
pre-birth for the reform in 2000, I also distinguish by mothers who already showed mental
health problems before giving birth. Mothers with mental health difficulties pre-birth
are especially prone to worse health in the medium-run due to longer leave. The point
estimate on the interaction term on outpatient health of e 3167.0 is very large and signif-
icant. At the mean, this estimate corresponds to more than a doubling. The same holds
true for GP costs and medication costs, while the latter effect is not significant.
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Furthermore, I also conduct subgroup analyses by tenure and work experience. For
brevity they are not reported here. I study different thresholds of tenure (3/5/10 years)
and experience (5/10/15 years). In general, mothers with shorter tenure benefit from
longer leave. This confirms the previous results as short tenure might again proxy for
an unstable environment. Additionally, mothers with long work experience tend to be
unaffected by any of the policy changes.
Altogether, the heterogeneity analysis reveals insights which are of great importance
for policy makers. The results suggest that parental leave can be too long. This is espe-
cially the case for high-wage and married mothers who seem to be in a stable environment.
Additionally, mothers with a bad mental health before birth, are especially prone to be
harmed by long leave. This type of mothers might need a stable work environment and
a long absence from work may deteriorate their health tremendously. Contrary, mothers
with unhealthy babies and to some extent also mothers with low-SES benefit from longer
leave which should be taken into account when entitling women to parental leave.
1.5.4 Robustness
I conduct several robustness analysis. I start by reporting the results of a placebo analysis
where I assume a reform in July 1992 or another one in July 1994. This sensitivity check
is reported in Table A.2 and shows no significant effect on any of the health outcome
measures for the 1994 reform and significant but very small effects for the 1992 reform.
Most of these significant estimates are economically not meaningful. Overall, this supports
the evidence that the previously reported estimates, are the result of the reform changes
in 1990, 1996, and 2000.
Table A.3 shows estimates on general health outcomes, where I additionally control for
maternal characteristics, such as her age, marital status, origin, and wage. In a standard
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RDD setting, including these controls should not matter, however, as not all of these
controls varied smoothly around the cutoff, I report this additional specification. The
results are very similarly to the previous stated ones and thus confirm the validity of the
RDD in this context.
In Tables A.4–A.6, I report the robustness to different choices of bandwidths. The
reported results show how estimates on the general health outcome measures vary from
choosing a bandwidth of 3 months up to 6 months. This exercise is each done individually
by reform.10 In general, the sign of the effects, and thus the interpretation of each policy
change, stays relatively constant over all choices of bandwidths.
Finally, I can also show the long-term effect of all three reforms on health outcomes
that are observable for all Austrian mothers who are working. These results are reported
graphically in Figure A.1, where I leave the empirical method unchanged as in Equation
(1.1) but include the full sample and not only those mothers who reside in Upper Austria.
Due to the continuous availability of the data over the entire reform period, I can now
compare all three reforms over the time period from 2 years pre-birth up to 14 years
post-birth. I show estimates for sickness days and mortality. The latter is a very severe
health measure and occurs seldomly and is, thus, a noisy measure.
The estimates on sickness days are most of the time insignificant. If anything, they
support the previous results for the 2000 reform which significantly deteriorated outpatient
maternal health. Also for the full Austrian sample, there seems to be a tendency for more
sickness days if facing longer parental leave. The same holds true for mortality. Both the
1990 and 2000 reforms seem to increase mortality. Especially for the 2000 reform, this
effect is sizable as it more than doubles mortality if evaluated at the pre-reform mean.
Overall, the harmful effect of the 2000 reform is also confirmed by this additional analysis.
10For all estimations I leave the functional form unchanged and estimate a so called linear interaction
model, where I allow for linear trends to be different before and after the reform.
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1.5.5 Health Gradient
This section discusses the general take-away from studying the three reforms. Specifically,
I adjust the previous analysis in order to be able to compare the 1990 and 1996 reforms,
and the 1996 and 2000 ones, directly. To do so, I focus on the years 9 to 11 after
giving birth for the first two reforms and the years 3 to 7 for the two latter reforms.
This adjustment enables having two overlapping time windows so that one can also say
something about the health gradient. These results are reported in Figure 1.3.
In Panel A, where I directly compare the 1990 and 1996 reforms, results are now
more noisy and, thus, not significant anymore due to the short overlap in years and the
consequent loss of data. The sign of the point estimates suggests that 2 years of parental
leave improves maternal outpatient health instead of only 1 year. 1.5 years is even better
for maternal outpatient health than 2 years of parental leave.
Panel B, which compares the 1996 and 2000 reforms, complements this picture. While
the two outcome measures of outpatient costs and medication costs clearly improve with
the 1996 reform, the same measures substantially deteriorate with the increase of parental
leave of 1 year to 2.5 years in 2000. This effect pattern becomes even larger over time
when moving toward 7 years after giving birth.
This analysis adds to the existing literature in the following dimension. As I can com-
pare several reforms in the same setting, and as these reforms both extend and decrease
parental leave, I can say something about the health gradient. This study is the first
to provide evidence that returns to longer leave can even become negative with too long
parental leave. This suggests a hump-shaped relationship between parental leave duration
and maternal health in the medium- to long-run.
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Figure 1.3: Comparing the Reforms Directly
Panel A: 1990 Reform vs 1996 Reform
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Notes: This Figure shows point estimates from estimating Equation (1.1) on different
accumulated health outcomes. Each dot represents a separate estimation on accumulating
the health outcome up to this point in time. Dashed lines report 95 percent confidence
intervals. In Panel A (B) point estimates for the 1990 (2000) reform are reported in black
and thus for the 1996 reform in grey.
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1.5.6 Subsequent Reforms
There were several additional family policy reforms in the 2000s, as described earlier on
and summarized in Table 1.1. Interestingly, these reforms allowed parents to choose from
a variety of options. As such, mothers who gave birth after the 1st of January 2008, were
given two shorter options (20 months and 15 months) additionally to the prevailing 30
months of parental leave. In January 2010, this choice set was enlarged with two other
even shorter options. These options would pay benefits for 12 months, either for a fixed
and flat benefit amount or for 80 percent of the last income.11 In general, shorter leave
duration pays a higher monthly benefit. However, in total, longer leave always sums up
to higher benefits.
None of these reforms can be evaluated with respect to the health outcomes, as I only
observe maternal health up to the year 2007. Nevertheless, it is interesting to look at the
choices of the mothers by income.12 These choices are presented in Table 1.9.
In 2007, when the parental leave is designed for 30 months, most of the mothers are
choosing this long version. Mothers can choose to finish parental leave earlier, which more
high-wage mothers than low-wage mothers choose to do. In 2008 and 2009, when the two
shorter options of 15 and 20 months become available, a substantial fraction of mothers
switch to one of these options. Roughly 15 percent of low-wage mothers and 20 percent
of high-wage mothers switch, respectively. As a result 70 percent of low-wage mothers are
still taking the longest available option, and 56 percent of high-wage mothers stick to it.
In 2010, where 12 months of leave are added to the choice set, the fraction of high-wage
mothers choosing this option increases drastically to 18 percent. This is the result of the
possibility of being paid 80 percent of the last wage, which attracts especially high-wage
11This last option was designed for fathers, to encourage paternal uptake of parental leave.
12This is the only characteristic that is still available for these mothers, as the availability of the birth
register ends in 2007.
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mothers. In 2010, 64 percent of low-wage mothers are on leave for 21–30 months and 46
percent of high-wage mothers are on leave for 21–30 months.
Altogether, as very long leave (2.5 years) has been shown to be harmful for maternal
health for all types of mothers, the percentages shown in Table 1.9 may suggest that a
broad range of options could increase inequality in this setting. High-wage mothers are
better in optimally choosing the months of parental leave. The structure of the parental
leave system also incentivizes them to go for shorter leave. This could be corrected by
allowing for different parental leave lengths with higher benefits per month for shorter
leave duration but an overall total amount that is the same among all options. The
current system, instead, favors long leave duration for low-wage mothers.13
1.6 Conclusion
I exploit three reforms that changed the length of parental leave to estimate the effect on
maternal health in the short- to long-run. The first reform in 1990, increased parental
leave by 1 year to 2 years. The second reform in 1996, partially reversed this back again
to 1.5 years. Finally, the third reform in 2000 increased parental leave to 2.5 years, thus
increasing it again by 1 year. There was strict enforcement, so that mothers giving birth
on June 30 would be subject to the old policy regime and mothers giving birth on July
1 to the new one. This allows to implement a regression discontinuity design, where I
additionally control for seasonality by estimating it in differences to the preceding non-
reform year. Maternal health can be evaluated from 1998 to 2007, and thus allows me to
estimate the impact of the policy reform from 1 year pre-birth up to 17 years post-birth.
The results provide evidence for a hump-shaped relationship between maternal health
and parental leave duration. Especially the 2000 reform seems harmful to maternal health
13The total amount paid to a mother who goes on leave for 12 months is e 12,000. The total amount
paid to a mother who goes on leave for 30 months sums up to e 13,080.
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Table 1.9: Parental Leave Decisions of Mothers from
2007 to 2010 by Income
Low-wage High-wage
Choices in 2007
1-12m 4.81 5.64
13-15m 2.25 3.95
16-20m 7.57 14.12
21-30m 85.36 76.29
Observations 21,813 23,031
Choices in 2008
1-12m 6.02 6.83
13-15m 3.62 5.71
16-20m 17.43 26.44
21-30m 72.93 61.01
Observations 23,741 25,099
Choices in 2009
1-12m 6.62 9.18
13-15m 3.85 7.76
16-20m 19.37 26.77
21-30m 70.15 56.30
Observations 23,742 25,557
Choices in 2010
1-12m 10.82 18.00
13-15m 5.38 12.69
16-20m 19.37 23.31
21-30m 64.43 46.00
Observations 25,727 27,893
Notes: This Table shows the percentage of eligi-
ble women who select into 1–12/13–15/16–20/21–
30 months of parental leave by wage-type for the
years 2007–2010. The month-ranges are derived
from the set of options that are available to mothers
as pointed out in Table 1.1. While in 2007 parental
leave is designed for 30 months, additional options
become available in 2008 and 2010.
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measured in the outpatient sector. Nevertheless, there seems to be a trade-off between
worse outpatient health and better inpatient health. Zooming into maternal health, the
drivers for the observed pattern seem to be prescribed medication costs. Of these, general
nervous system medication and more specifically painkillers are significant explanatory
variables. For all three reforms, effects accumulate over time, such that one would expect
even stronger effects in the very long-run.
A heterogeneity analysis reveals interesting additional insights. Low-SES mothers
(proxied by low-wage and unmarried) benefit more from the first extension to 2 years.
While the second reform that decreases parental leave to 1.5 years, generally has no
significant impact on outpatient health, this is not true for mothers with unhealthy babies
(proxied by a preterm birth or low birth weight). For mothers of unhealthy babies a
reduction in parental leave to 1.5 years increases their health costs significantly. The 2000
reform, finally, is especially harmful for mothers who already showed mental disorders
pre-birth.
A descriptive analysis of subsequent reforms concerning the family policy system,
which enable mothers to choose from a variety of options, reveals that high-wage mothers
are more likely to choose shorter durations than low-wage mothers. This might suggest
that, as very long leave is harmful for all types of mothers, the current policy structure
could increase health inequalities across low- and high-wage mothers.
This paper confirms the findings of Butikofer et al. (2018) who state that there are
diminishing returns to maternity leave length. Cautiously interpreting the findings in this
paper, one could possibly argue that the returns can even become negative with too long
parental leave length. The heterogeneity analysis also shows that it is very important to
take birth outcomes, such as the baby being born preterm or with low birth weight, and
maternal characteristics into account as well, when designing family policies.
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Chapter 2
Womb at Work:
The Missing Impact of Maternal
Employment on Newborn Health
A version of this paper is under review at the Journal of Health Economics.
2.1 Introduction
Most high-income countries have seen a significant and steady increase in female labor
force participation over the last few decades. Therefore, women today are much more
likely to work while pregnant. At the same time, family policies have become much
more generous since the turn of the century with multifold goals such as gender equity,
higher fertility, and better child development (Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2017). One family
policy instrument is prenatal maternity leave intended to protect both the health of the
mother and the newborn. The duration of prenatal leave varies substantially—from 0 to
11 weeks—in European countries (Jurviste et al., 2016). This variation across countries
mirrors the uncertainty among policy makers on how to optimally design such programs
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and concerning the role of maternal leave. In the fetal origins hypothesis literature, several
pregnancy conditions have already been identified as key influencing factors on a variety
of long-term outcomes of children. If prenatal maternal employment is among them, long-
term benefits for the children may offset the costs of prenatal maternity leave. Therefore,
understanding the effects of maternal employment during pregnancy on newborn health
is key for policy makers who design policies concerning prenatal maternity leave.
There is a large body of literature estimating the effects of pregnancy conditions on
newborn health and long-term outcomes of children as summarized by Almond and Cur-
rie (2011) and Almond et al. (2018). However, there is little evidence on the effect of
prenatal employment on newborn health. This is critical because the prenatal mater-
nal employment status combines several major aspects of pregnancy conditions such as
stress, physical activity, disease environment, income, and others. In theory, the impact
of prenatal employment is ambiguous. On the one hand, maternal employment during
pregnancy may be stressful for the mother or may correlate with exposure to pollutants
and diseases. These influences have been shown to be detrimental to the unborn baby
(Aizer et al., 2015; Currie and Schwandt, 2013, 2016; Schwandt, 2018). On the other
hand, employment may also increase a mother’s income or may be a joyful activity itself,
which therefore could improve newborn health (Almond et al., 2011; Hoynes et al., 2015).
This paper provides evidence on the effect of maternal employment during pregnancy
on newborn health by exploiting three reforms in Austria that affected mothers’ likeli-
hood of working during pregnancy with their second child. These three reforms on the
duration of parental leave allow me to employ a regression discontinuity setting. In order
to empirically analyze the impact of prenatal maternal employment, I use administrative
data from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which contains the full work
history for private-sector employees. This data set can be linked to the Austrian Birth
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Register (ABR), which covers all births with several indicators on newborn health and
characteristics about mothers.
Parental leave policies in Austria consist of both a flat benefit and job protection.
Beginning in 1990, there have been several reforms affecting the duration of parental
leave. In 1990, parental leave was extended by one year, from 12 to 24 months. In 1996,
this was partially reversed to 18 months, but increased to 30 months in 2000. These
changes led to an easier automatic extension for another parental leave period upon the
birth of an additional child—the so called grace period rule. This rule exempts mothers
from working and therefore reduces a mother’s probability of working during pregnancy
with the second child.
I find no evidence of prenatal employment effects on newborn health. This holds true
for a variety of outcomes measured via birth weight, gestational age, and Apgar scores.
Thus, I cannot reject that there are no effects of maternal employment during pregnancy
on newborn health, despite a very strong first stage. Across all policy reforms, the duration
of parental leave significantly affects the mother’s employment status during pregnancy
with her second child. The effect of the July 1990 reform, which increased parental leave
by 12 months to 24 months, corresponds to a 19.1 percentage point decline in the share of
mothers’ working during pregnancy. This effect is homogeneous over the entire first seven
months of a pregnancy. A heterogeneity analysis reveals marginally different, but always
significant, effects for a large set of subsamples stratified by a mother’s marital status,
occupational collar, and industry. However, I detected no significant effects on newborn
health for any of these subsamples.
Significantly, the study is based on a large administrative sample that allows me to
precisely estimate the effects and to rule out sizeable newborn health effect-patterns.
Furthermore, all covariates vary smoothly around the cutoffs of the policy reform, which
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supports the interpretation of the regression discontinuity; the results are robust to a
variety of different specifications. For example, I test for different birth weight and gesta-
tional age thresholds, apply a Donut estimation to deal with delayed Caesarean sections,
and implement a bounds estimator to control for selection.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on pregnancy conditions on
infant health and specifically, on prenatal maternal employment on infant health.1 Wu¨st
(2015) employs Danish survey data in a regression analysis and finds positive effects for
working mothers with closely spaced consecutive births or those who change their em-
ployment status due to educational reasons. Rossin (2011) analyzes the impact of unpaid
maternity leave provisions in the United States and documents small increases in birth
weight and a reduction in premature birth and infant mortality. Stearns (2015) studies
time off from work during late pregnancy under a temporary disability insurance program.
She finds beneficial effects for newborns of unmarried and black mothers. Ahammer et al.
(2018) analyze a 1975 reform in Austria that extended prenatal maternity leave from six
to eight weeks. They find no evidence for significant effects on newborn health.2
My paper adds to this literature in the following ways. It is the first to provide clear
evidence of the effect of maternal employment up to and including the seventh month
of a pregnancy on the health of the newborn. This setting, when combined with pre-
1This study also relates to the literature studying the effects of parental leave on other types of
outcomes such as maternal labor market outcomes, fertility, child and maternal health, and cognitive
development of children. In the Austrian context, Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) and Lalive et al. (2013),
for example, study the effect of the same reforms on maternal labor market outcomes and fertility, while
Danzer and Lavy (2018) and Danzer et al. (2017) focus on cognitive outcomes of the affected children.
More broadly, there is a large body of literature that studies the effect of post birth parental leave reforms
on child development (Baker and Milligan, 2008b; Beuchert et al., 2016; Carneiro et al., 2015; Dahl et al.,
2016; Danzer and Lavy, 2018; Dustmann and Scho¨nberg, 2012; Ruhm, 2000; Tanaka, 2005; Rasmussen,
2010). Generally, the literature concludes that introducing parental leave significantly improves child
development in both the short and long run while extensions in the duration of parental leave often do
not lead to significant changes in child development.
2A related study by Ginja et al. (in press) analyzes the effect of a speed premium in Sweden, analogous
to the grace period in Austria. In their study, the effect of maternal employment on newborn health is not
directly addressed. However, they document a slight decline in maternal employment during pregnancy
with the second child and no effects on outcomes measured at birth as a result of the speed premium.
The effect size of the analyzed policy reform on maternal employment is -0.013, substantially smaller
than the 0.191 I find.
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vious literature that focused almost exclusively on the very end of a pregnancy, helps
in understanding when in pregnancy time off might be most beneficial. Using the de-
scribed reforms for exogenous variation in prenatal maternal employment up to the 32nd
pregnancy week generates a large and representative sample of compliers. This com-
plements the existing literature on maternal employment during pregnancy on newborn
health as I do not have to rely on differential take-up of welfare programs by rich and
white mothers (as in the context of unpaid leave) or unmarried and black mothers (in
the case of disability insurance). Furthermore, I am able to use a large administrative
data set on an individual basis that allows me to exactly identify the exposed mothers
and their offspring. Based on this data set, I can calculate the exact number of days a
mother is working during pregnancy. Significantly, this allows me to analyze the impact
of prenatal employment on two margins—the extensive margin of mothers who choose
to work or not during pregnancy and the intensive margin of working mothers—as I can
factor in unusually detailed information on maternal employment histories. The richness
of the data also makes it possible to analyze heterogeneous effects across mothers and by
work environment. Finally, in the Austrian context, the rich data can be combined with
a diverse policy setting. I explore the impact of prenatal employment in three different
points in time that allow me to both assess the effects of increases as well as decreases in
employment during pregnancy. Variation in both directions allows for study of asymme-
tries in an already generous leave setting with strong changes in parental leave duration
across the studied time period.
Overall, my results show that large changes in prenatal employment do not imply
significant changes of newborn health. This suggests that parental leave policies should
focus on parental leave after the birth, given that time spent with parents especially in
very early childhood has been shown to be beneficial in a number of outcomes (Carneiro
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et al., 2015; Rossin-Slater, 2018; Heckman, 2007).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the Austrian parental leave
system and the reforms used for this study. Section 2.3 develops a conceptual framework
on how prenatal maternal employment can affect newborn health. Section 2.4 discusses
the data and Section 2.5 presents the empirical strategy. Section 2.6 provides an overall
assessment of the results and sensitivity analyses, which will be discussed in Section 2.7.
The paper concludes in Section 2.8.
2.2 The Institutional Setting
The Austrian family policy rules consist of two types of policies that cover the period
around birth. The first policy, mandatory maternity leave (ML), prohibits work 8 weeks
pre- and post-birth and pays the average wage a mother earned during the last quarter
prior to giving birth. As such, ML promises a generous environment in order to protect
both the mother’s and the baby’s health. After mandatory maternity leave expires, eligible
mothers can choose to take parental leave (PL). This second policy consists of two pillars:
a flat benefit and job protection. The policy changes that I will assess in this paper affect
parental leave, which will be explained in more detail below.
First-time mothers over the age of 25 are eligible for parental leave if they have worked
for at least 52 weeks within the 2 years prior to giving birth.3 The work requirement
is reduced to 20 weeks within the year prior to giving birth for higher-order births.4
Furthermore, there is a grace period rule that allows mothers with relatively short birth
spacing an automatic extension for the next birth. More specifically, the grace period
exempts mothers from the work requirement if they give birth to an additional child no
later than 3.5 months after the expiration of the parental leave of the previous child.
3Work requirements are shorter for younger mothers.
4This is changed to 26 weeks after July 1996.
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Since 1990, there have been several reforms to the parental leave system; they are
illustrated in Figure 2.1. Political debate about the introduction of paternal leave at the
costs of maternal leave led to the compromise of extending the duration of parental leave.
Furthermore, in the early 1990s, formal child care institutions were scarce in Austria.
This made maternal employment during the child’s early years difficult and could possibly
even deter mothers from the labor market in the long run. Extending parental leave was
expected to improve this situation for mothers.
The reforms were structured as follows. While parental leave lasted up to the first
birthday of the child until June 1990, this was extended to 24 months after birth in July
1990. The July 1996 reform, which targeted the cash benefits but left job protection
unchanged, reserved 6 of these added months for fathers. This effectively reduced the
duration of parental leave to 18 months after birth because almost no fathers were taking
advantage of the leave. The July 2000 reform, which again only targeted cash trans-
fers, increased parental leave to 36 months after birth, reserving 6 months for fathers.
Therefore, it essentially increased parental leave from 18 to 30 months after birth.5
The changes in parental leave duration had strong implications for the likelihood that
mothers would give birth to another child within the grace period. Prior to June 1990, a
mother had to conceive the next child no later than 5.5 months after giving birth to her
first child in order to meet the requirements for automatic extension, which is biologically
difficult.6 The 1990 reform extended the window to conceive to 17.5 months; the July
1996 reform partially reversed it to 11.5 months, while the July 2000 reform extended it
again to 23.5 months. All of these time windows are biologically feasible and desirable.7
5For further and more detailed information on the amount of cash benefits, eligibility criteria, an-
nouncement of the policy reforms, and the reforms tehmselves, see Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) and
Lalive et al. (2013).
6Mothers who exclusively breastfeed have 98 percent protection from pregnancy in the first six months
(Kennedy et al., 1989).
7Short (often defined as less than 18 months) and very long (more than 59 months) interpregnancy
intervals are associated with adverse perinatal outcomes (see Conde-Agudelo et al. (2006) for a meta-
analysis on birth spacing).
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Figure 2.1: Overview Policy Changes
Until June 1990: Baseline
2m
ML
2m
ML
10m
PL
max 3.5m
for automatic
extension
birth
0y 1y
2nd birth
latest 2y
latest conception
5.5m
July 1990 - June 1996: Expansion Period I
2m
ML
2m
ML
22m
PL
max 3.5m
for automatic
extension
birth
0y 1y
2nd birth
latest2y
latest conception
17.5m
July 1996 - June 2000: Reduction Period I
2m
ML
2m
ML
16m
PL
max 3.5m
for automatic
extension
birth
0y
1y
2nd birth
latest 2y
latest conception
11.5m
Post June 2000: Expansion Period II
2m
ML
2m
ML
28m
PL
max 3.5m
for automatic
extension
birth
0y 1y
2nd birth
latest
2y
latest conception
23.5m
Notes: This Figure shows in an illustrative way how the three policy reforms affected the latest conception
date for a second birth so that mothers would automatically be able to prolong their first parental leave
spell without having to go back to work during pregnancy with the second child. Parental leave solely
refers here to the provision of cash benefits. While job protection increases in the first reform to 24
months it stays unchanged thereafter.
Figure B.1 in the Appendix8 shows how the percentage of children born within parental
leave and the grace period has evolved over time. By construction, longer parental leave
will lead to higher fractions of second children born within this time period. Although
prior to July 1990, only 10 percent of all second born were born within the period of
8All following Figures and Tables denoted by B are reported in the Appendix: Chapter 2.
50
parental leave extended by the grace period, that number increased to around 40 percent
for the period from July 1990 to June 1996. In July 1996, there was a drop to 20 percent
given the shorter parental leave for these cohorts. The number increased again with the
very generous parental leave system established in July 2000.
Figure 2.2 exploits the discontinuities induced by the reforms and looks at pregnancies
with second children for mothers that gave birth to their first child each of the 2 years
pre- and post-policy reform. It shows that this simplification in meeting the requirements
for the grace period in July 1990 went hand in hand with fewer women working during
pregnancy with their second child. These effects are equally spread over the entire first
32 weeks of pregnancy. Thereafter, mothers go on mandatory maternity leave and do
not have to work under either scheme. The decline in duration in July 1996 led to more
women working during the entire pregnancy, while the increase in duration in July 2000
again translated into fewer women working during pregnancy with their second child.
Figure 2.2: Employment Status of Mothers by Week of Pregnancy
(a) 1990 (b) 1996 (c) 2000
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Notes: This Figure reports the share of women who work during pregnancy with their second child.
Mothers considered are all women pregnant with their second child who gave birth to their first child 24
months before and after the policy changes in July 1990, July 1996 and July 2000. Hollow squares and
circles refer to weeks where mothers are supposed to be on maternity leave (after week 32). The sample
consists of all matched and eligible mothers that are still pregnant at a given week of pregnancy (i.e.
with preterm births the sample gets smaller moving from week 0 to week 40).
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2.3 Conceptual Framework
Prenatal maternal employment may affect newborn health through various channels.
While several of these channels have each been analyzed individually in the previous
literature, the combined effect of prenatal employment on newborn health is not clear a
priori. I next describe each of these possible channels in more detail.
First, working itself could be stressful for the mother. Existing empirical literature on
the effects of maternal stress on infant health is generally limited to studying the effects
of very severe but often unique stress factors such as domestic violence (Aizer, 2011),
hurricanes (Currie and Rossin-Slater, 2013), political uprising (Lee, 2014), death of a
relative (Black et al., 2016; Persson and Rossin-Slater, 2018), and terrorism (Quintana-
Domeque and Ro´denas-Serrano, 2017; Camacho, 2008). Although all these studies show
a negative impact of these events on newborn health, the effects of milder stress, for
example, stress induced by work, are less clear. As recently summarized by Almond
et al. (2018), relatively mild shocks in early or prenatal life can, however, have substantial
negative impact on child development. Additionally, it is unclear whether mental and
physical stress affect the fetus similarly and whether these stresses might cause different
effects when they are experienced early or late in pregnancy.
Second, being on PL and therefore not working during pregnancy is also related to
changes in income. The intensity of this effect depends on a mother’s income. In fact,
PL benefits are flat over the entire PL and amount to roughly e340 per month.9 This
translates into an income increase for low-income mothers and an income reduction for
high-income mothers. However, in the literature, the income effect on newborn health is
almost exclusively identified for low-income mothers. Hoynes et al. (2015), for example,
show that the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United States reduces the inci-
9According to Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) this corresponds to a median net income replacement
ratio of more than 40 percent.
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dence of low birth weight and increases mean birth weight. Almond et al. (2011) exploit
monthly variation in the introduction of the Food Stamp Program (FSP) in the United
States and find positive effects for birth outcomes especially at the lower tail of the birth
weight distribution. Both papers focus on programs designed for low-income people. Fur-
thermore, evidence from conditional cash transfers in developing countries also show a
positive impact on several birth outcomes (Barber and Gertler, 2008; Amarante et al.,
2016). However, as PL benefits are flat and therefore only negatively impact high-wage
mothers, the effect of income in this setup is less clear. I will investigate this issue in a
heterogeneity analysis.
Third, working during pregnancy might expose the mother to pollutants and diseases
at work or while commuting. These influences have been shown to be negative for the
fetus (Almond, 2006; Schwandt, 2018; Currie et al., 2009; Currie and Schwandt, 2013,
2016). Both Almond (2006) and Schwandt (2018) even show that flu exposure during
pregnancy has long-term effects on children’s educational attainment and wages.
Fourth, a side effect of the extension of the grace period could also be shorter birth
spacing between siblings. The medical literature argues that short spacing (most often
defined as less than 18 months in age difference) leads to adverse infant health outcomes
(see Conde-Agudelo et al. (2006) for a meta-analysis).
2.4 Data
This project is based on two administrative data sets. The primary source of data for the
determination of a mother’s work status during pregnancy is the Austrian Social Security
Database (ASSD). For the analysis of newborn health outcomes, I link the ASSD to the
Austrian Birth Register (ABR).
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The Austrian Social Security Database. The ASSD stores the full work history of
private-sector employees and is used to verify pension claims. The ASSD also records the
date of all live births after entering the labor market and maternity and parental leave
periods if taken. As a result, I observe detailed information on a daily basis for each
woman after her first entry into the labor market. Detailed labor market information
consists of the employer, along with information on occupation, experience, and tenure.
Information on earnings is provided per year and per employer.
The Austrian Birth Register. Information about newborn health measures is based on
the ABR, which includes all live births in Austria. Each birth entry consists of individual-
level information on birth characteristics such as date, place, gender, multiple births,
gestational length, birth weight, length, and Apgar scores. Furthermore, for every birth,
maternal socioeconomic characteristics such as age, educational attainment, marital sta-
tus, and country of origin complement the individual-level information.
I match the two sources of data based on characteristics I observe in both data sets,
such as the date of birth, the date of preceding birth for higher-order births, location of
birth, and age of the mother.10 For my main analysis, I restrict my sample to private
sector dependent employees who are PL eligible, aged 15–45, and who are giving birth to
a singleton.11 Furthermore, I restrict my main sample to the period of 1984 to 2007, as
gestational length, one of my key variables, is only recorded after 1984. Altogether, this
10This results in 61 percent of matches of all births in the birth register, corresponding to roughly 80
percent of all births observed in the ASSD. Once a mother leaves the labor market and gives birth to
additional children, these birth dates will not be recorded in the ASSD any longer. However, based on
information about the characteristics of the mother herself and the date of birth of the preceding child,
I am able to recover some births that are only observed in the Austrian Birth Register. The mother’s
unique social security number can be added to these recovered births. This method allows me to add
87,362 births to the combined data set.
11For PL eligibility I follow the definition of Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009). In order to construct the
eligible sample, I consider the work history 2 years prior to giving birth to the first child. Women who
show any form of employment or were eligible to collect unemployment benefits are considered eligible.
This very generous form of eligibility results in 95 percent of women being eligible for PL.
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results in around 60,000 observed births per year out of roughly 85,000 births in Austria.
Finally, I construct several variables that are key for my analysis. From all birth entries
per mother, I calculate the parity for every birth. Furthermore, I calculate the days a
mother has been working during pregnancy and based on this, I create a dummy for the
work status, defined as 1 if she worked a positive number of days during pregnancy.12
In addition to days worked, days sick during pregnancy can be calculated in the same
manner. From this, I create a sickness dummy equaling 1 if a positive number of days sick
are reported. This sickness dummy will be used as an additional explanatory variable in
the OLS regression and allows me to compare my results to Wu¨st (2015).
For the analysis of the impact on newborn health, I use several measures of birth out-
comes because these have already been shown to be linked to later-life outcomes (Almond
and Currie, 2011). First, I include a dummy for low birth weight (below 2,500 grams) as
a general measure. Second, I construct a dummy for prematurity equaling 1 if gestational
length is less than 37 weeks.13 Additionally, I will show results for birth weight, gesta-
tional length, 1 minute Apgar score, and a dummy for a healthy Apgar score (1[Apgar >=
7]). The Apgar score is a method of giving a quick summary of the newborn’s physical
health. It individually measures per category, on a scale from 0 to 2, the newborn’s skin
color, heart rate, reflexes, muscle tone, and respiratory effort. A total Apgar score of 10
indicates perfect health, and an Apgar score below 7 is defined as low.
Finally, I control for the following maternal characteristics: a dummy for marital sta-
tus, an indicator of foreign origin, 5-year age brackets, and an indicator combining wage
12I count both normal as well as marginal employment as working days and use the terms worked
and employed interchangeably. For the construction of the number of days a mother worked, gestational
length in weeks (multiplied by 7 days a week) is subtracted from the exact date of birth. Working days
(MO-FR) are being calculated from the day of conception to the last day of pregnancy.
13Both thresholds of weight (low birth weight) and gestational age (preterm) are defined by the World
Health Organization.
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and educational data.14 For the heterogeneity analysis, I further add a dummy for having
worked in a blue-collar job during the first pregnancy.
Summary Statistics. Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the full matched
and eligible sample. While column (1) describes the full sample, columns (2)–(4) restrict
the sample to second-born children with older siblings born in the vicinity of the policy
reform thresholds.15 When compared to the full sample, second born with older siblings
born around a policy reform are less likely to be born preterm and with low birth weight.
Their mothers are more likely to be married and older, as expected. Therefore, as I
will focus on higher-order born children who are potentially affected by their mother’s
longer (or shorter) parental leave stay with the first-born child, the sample will be slightly
positively selected with respect to newborn health. However, as 78 percent of Austrian
families have more than one child in my sample, this implies that my analysis is based on
a non-negligible fraction of births.
In the restricted samples (columns (2)–(4)), the average birth weight ranges from
3,381–3,419 grams and the average gestational length is around 39.7 weeks. The average
occurrence of a low birth weight birth is between 3.2–3.3 percent and the one of a preterm
birth 3.2–3.6 percent. The 1 minute Apgar scores vary between 8.7–8.9 and 95.8–97.5
percent of the newborns have a healthy Apgar score above 7. Most of the mothers are
married (0.72–0.80) and give birth to their second child between the ages of 25–29 (0.38–
0.45). On average, about 60 percent of the mothers work during pregnancy with their
second child and spend 63–69 days at work.
14Following Danzer et al. (2017), I construct this indicator variable by defining all mothers as low SES
who completed compulsory schooling or who completed apprenticeship training or intermediate vocational
school and additionally have low wages. For the assignment to high and low wage, I use average wage
data in the two years prior to a mother’s first birth. I classify a women as low wage if her wage is below
or equal to the median wage in that specific birth year for all women in my sample. Mothers who have
completed at least high school or who finished apprenticeship training or intermediate vocational school
and earn a high wage are defined as high-SES mothers.
15The chosen bandwidth in my baseline analysis is 24 months pre- and post-policy reform.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Full
sample
1990
sample
1996
sample
2000
sample
Birth weight (in gram) 3,320.028 3,381.319 3,410.534 3,419.033
(519.768) (500.795) (505.488) (503.999)
Birth length (in cm) 50.494 50.699 50.785 50.746
(2.641) (2.507) (2.559) (2.572)
Gestational length (in weeks) 39.686 39.797 39.757 39.665
(1.776) (1.625) (1.678) (1.710)
Preterm birth 0.043 0.032 0.033 0.036
Low birth weight 0.046 0.032 0.032 0.033
Apgar 1min score 8.741 8.798 8.850 8.891
(1.096) (0.992) (0.950) (0.903)
Healthy Apgar score (>= 7) 0.958 0.968 0.971 0.975
Female baby 0.487 0.489 0.486 0.487
Mother married 0.688 0.804 0.763 0.724
Mother foreign 0.121 0.087 0.140 0.152
Mother aged 15-19 0.056 0.013 0.009 0.009
Mother aged 20-24 0.278 0.248 0.174 0.178
Mother aged 25-29 0.356 0.445 0.412 0.375
Mother aged 30-34 0.221 0.230 0.312 0.323
Mother aged 35-39 0.077 0.058 0.086 0.103
Mother aged 40-45 0.012 0.006 0.008 0.011
Mother of low SES 0.519 0.529 0.464 0.436
Worked 0.759 0.611 0.607 0.563
Days worked 95.881 69.826 68.847 63.528
Observations 1,279,374 87,566 77,279 63,481
Notes: The full sample covers the universe of births occurring from 1984 to
2007 to matched and eligible mothers. Columns (2)–(4) restrict the full sample
to second born children with an older sibling that is born 24 months pre- and
post a policy reform. The policy reforms considered happen in July 1990 for
column (2), July 1996 for column (3) and July 2000 for column (4).
2.5 Empirical Design
This paper focuses on identifying the causal effect of working during pregnancy on new-
born health. Specifically, consider the following baseline model:
Yi = β0 + β1work
m
i + β2X
c
i + β3X
m
i + τt + i, (2.1)
where for each individual i, Yi is the outcome of interest. work
m
i represents a dummy for
the work status of the mother during pregnancy or the days worked. Xci controls for the
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child’s gender. The vector Xmi of maternal characteristics includes controls for 5-year age
brackets, marital status, origin, and low SES. τt is a vector controlling for year of birth
and month of birth fixed effects and i is an error term. β1 is the coefficient of interest
corresponding to the effect of prenatal employment on newborn health.
One issue with estimating Equation (2.1) is omitted variable bias. One such example
is the mother’s own health status. A mother might choose not to work because she is in
bad health, which also directly influences the health of her own child. Other unobserved
variables that could threaten the validity of a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) ap-
proach, are, for example, income and stress.
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). To overcome the issue of omitted variable
bias, I base my analysis on the described reforms of the parental leave system that generate
quasi-experimental variation in the likelihood of mothers working during pregnancy. More
specifically, I use three separate regression discontinuities for the three reforms in July
1990, July 1996, and July 2000. The RDD method and its use in economics is extensively
summarized by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010b). It is based
on the intuition that all mothers giving birth to their first child just before or just after
a policy change do not differ discontinuously in their characteristics, but rather, face two
different policies that discontinuously affect a mother’s prenatal employment status.
To see this better, imagine two mothers, Mother A and Mother B. Mother A gives
birth to her first child in June 1990 and can stay on parental leave up to the first birthday
of her child. She has to conceive her second baby by December 1990. If she meets this
time window, she does not have to go back to work during the pregnancy with her second
child. Mother B gives birth to her first child in July 1990, only one month later than
Mother A. She can stay on parental leave for two years and must conceive by January
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1992 in order to be exempt from the work requirement. Mother A and Mother B are
unlikely to differ in characteristics ex ante. However, Mother B is much more likely to
give birth to another child within the grace period. This discontinuity in the likelihood of
working during pregnancy with the consecutive child stemming from an exogenous policy
reform will be exploited in the following estimation.
Estimation. Following Jacob et al. (2012) and Lee and Lemieux (2010b), I estimate
local linear regressions in samples around the cutoffs. I estimate separate OLS regres-
sions with a rectangular kernel for each cutoff date and choose in my context a meaningful
bandwidth of 24 months. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010b), the choice of kernel typ-
ically has little impact in practice. I also conduct a sensitivity analysis with different
bandwidths chosen by the method of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) or Calonico et al.
(2018).16 I report graphical evidence of the robustness to different bandwidths in the
Appendix.
I start by documenting the discontinuity of prolonged parental leave on prenatal em-
ployment for mothers having a second child. I estimate the following first-stage regression:
workmi = γ0 + γ1Ti + γ2Ri + γ3Ti ∗Ri + υi. (2.2)
The variable Ti describes an indicator variable for having an older sibling being born
in the post-policy reform period. Ri is the rating variable, which indicates the number
of months from the older sibling’s birth date to the date of policy change, and υi is an
idiosyncratic error term. The parameter of interest in Equation (2.2) is γ1. γ1 describes
16The bandwidth selection according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) is implemented in Stata
by the command rdcv and choosing ik as method. The bandwidth selection according to Calonico et al.
(2018) is implemented in Stata by the command rdbwselect and choosing the default method mserd.
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the size of the change in the outcome workmi at the date of the policy reforms and therefore
highlights the discontinuity in the share of mothers working during pregnancy with their
second child.
In a second step, I examine the effect of the policy reform on newborn health using
the following reduced form equation:
Yi = δ0 + δ1Ti + δ2Ri + δ3Ti ∗Ri + νi. (2.3)
This reduced form equation provides estimates of the net effect of parental leave reforms
on newborn health.
Identification. The identifying assumptions for inference using the RDD are: (1) the
probability of being treated must be discontinuous at the cutoff, and (2) there should be no
discontinuity in potential outcomes at the cutoff (Lee and Lemieux, 2010b). The second
statement requires that no observable nor unobservable factors exhibit any discontinuities
at the cutoffs. This is likely fulfilled if there is no precise manipulation on either side of
the cutoff.
While assumption (1) holds by construction of the policy reform, assumption (2) can-
not be directly validated. However, I can conduct standard tests for asserting the validity
of assumption (2). The timing of the policy announcement guarantees that individu-
als cannot perfectly sort at the policy reform threshold. As described by Lalive and
Zweimu¨ller (2009), the policy reform in 1990, for example, was only announced three
months before implementation and therefore made perfect birth planning impossible.
However, pregnant mothers could still influence the timing of a birth via a Caesarean
section within a short time window, which I will address in the robustness analysis.
Additionally, to assess credibility of assumption (2) based on observables, I visualize
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the relationship between the covariates and the rating variable as reported in Figure B.2.
In the context of possible confounders, these variables should evolve smoothly across the
cutoff. Furthermore, I also report a Covariate Balance Test (see Table B.1), where I test
for discontinuities in my observable variables using regressions outcomes. Across all these
tests, the smoothness of predetermined observable maternal characteristics is fulfilled.17
Sample Selection. Although the regression discontinuity design likely circumvents the
problem of omitted variables bias described above, it does not solve the problem of sample
selection. Sample selection in this context can arise as only newborn health measures
become observable for those women who choose to become mothers. If the policy changes
regarding the duration of paid parental leave directly affect fertility decisions, this might
influence the sample of mothers for which the newborn’s health is observed. In their
analysis, Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) and Lalive et al. (2013) show direct fertility effects
of the 1990 policy reform, but no such effects for the other two reforms, in 1996 and
2000.18 In order to address the issue of sample selection in the 1990 reform, I follow the
approach described by Kim (2016) and Dong (2019) in a robustness analysis to support
the causal interpretation of prenatal employment and not only the net effect of the policy
reform.
The approach is based on estimating treatment bounds in the presence of sample selec-
tion, leaving the formal specification in Equations (2.2) and (2.3) unchanged. Compared
to other approaches that deal with sample selection, the chosen one does not require
specifying any selection mechanism nor any exclusion restrictions. The only additional
assumption for identification is (3) monotonicity, which implies that observability of out-
17The covariate balance test for the effect on being married reports a significant reduction on being
married after the 2000 reform. However, in terms of magnitude this effect is relatively small.
18I re-estimate the fertility effect for the 1990 reform with my own sample and find that the policy
leads to 2.5 additional children per 100 women within three years. With an estimated first-stage effect
size of 19.1 women per 100 women who additionally do not work after the change in the policy, the effect
of the sample selection seems relatively small.
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comes is only affected in one direction due to treatment assignment. In the described
context, this means that all mothers who gave birth to an additional child in the less-
generous parental leave period (before July 1990) would also give birth under the new
rules. After the policy reform, additional mothers join the sample who are only induced to
give birth to another child under the more generous policy scheme. Monotonicity would
be violated if there are mothers who would only give birth to an additional child in the
less-generous pre-reform policy period. Here, the assumption of monotonocity is reason-
able as mothers who give birth after the policy reform could still go back to work after 1
year and face the same opportunities as pre-policy reform.
The treatment bounds are intended to estimate the share of additional mothers in the
after-reform sample (∼5 percent). These are the marginal mothers who were induced to
have a second child by the reform. Their newborns’ outcomes are observable after the
reform but not before. In terms of outcomes, these newborns cannot be distinguished
from the control group. Therefore, without invoking any additional assumptions, one can
assume the extreme situation. In this extreme situation, I restrict the sample to a very
favorable group (excluding the lower 5 percent in the respective outcome distribution)
and a very unfavourable group (excluding the upper 5 percent in the respective outcome
distribution). This provides me with a lower and an upper bound.19
2.6 Results
This section starts by discussing the OLS effects of working during pregnancy on new-
born health. I will then show RDD estimates of the effects of changing PL duration on
maternal employment during pregnancy with her second child and newborn health. I end
by reporting several sensitivity analyses in order to test for robustness.
19Standard errors in this approach are calculated via bootstrapping.
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2.6.1 Baseline OLS Estimates
Table 2.2 presents baseline OLS results for estimates of Equation (2.1). All columns are
estimated on the pooled sample of the three RDD 24-months-bandwidth samples with
second-born children. Columns (1) and (3) include only child-level characteristics such as
a gender dummy, year, and month of birth fixed effects. In columns (2) and (4), referred
to as the full control model, I additionally control for mother-level characteristics: 5-year
age dummies,20 an indicator of foreign origin, a dummy for the marital status, and a
dummy for low SES.
Table 2.2 is split into Panel A, the extensive margin effect of the work status on new-
born health, and Panel B, the intensive margin effect of days worked on newborn health.
Both a mother’s work status and the days worked during pregnancy are positively related
to newborn health outcome measures. The full control model suggests that children of
mothers who work during pregnancy are, at the mean, 6.3 percent less likely to be born
preterm and 7.0 percent less likely to be of low birth weight, respectively.21 The effect
sizes are slightly bigger in the full control model for the effect of days worked. A baby
of a mother who works 65 days (the average of the three RDD samples) versus that of a
mother who does not work at all, is on average 19.4 percent less likely to be born preterm
and 19.9 percent less likely to be of low birth weight, all else being equal. Estimates on
the two continuous outcome variables of birth weight and gestational length and those for
the 1 minute Apgar score and the healthy Apgar score dummy are reported in Table 2.3.
They all show the same direction of correlations, while the ones with the Apgar scores
are relatively weak.
The sickness dummy is negatively correlated with all newborn health measures, as
20I also test for other specifications of the age variable commonly used in the literature, such as age
and age squared. My main coefficients of interest are, however, unaffected.
21The percent terms are evaluated at the mean of the dependent variable, i.e. for the outcome variable
preterm: (0.0335-0.0021)/0.0335-1 = -0.063.
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Table 2.2: OLS Results on Preterm and Low Birth Weight
Dependent Variable Preterm Low birth weight
Panel A: Work status
Worked −0.0020∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Sick 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Panel B: Days worked
Days worked −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Sick 0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Mother Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.0335 0.0335 0.0327 0.0327
Observations 226,824 226,824 226,824 226,824
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table is estimated on the pooled sample of the three RDD regression windows.
Additional controls included in all columns are year and month of birth FE, and a gender
dummy. Mother’s characteristic controls are dummies for 5 year age brackets, marital
status, a dummy for low SES (combined from educational and wage data) and a foreign
origin dummy.
reported in Panels A and B in Table 2.2. The full control model shows that being sick
leads at the mean to an increase of 91.0–93.4 percent and 91.1–93.3 percent in preterm
birth and low birth weight, respectively. To give some idea of the magnitude of this effect,
I can compare this finding with Wu¨st (2015). She reports an increase in preterm birth of
roughly 43 percent at the mean if the mother reports being sick during pregnancy.22
Controlling for mother’s characteristics only marginally affects the size of the coeffi-
cients of interest.23 However, controlling for a broad set of observables is not sufficient
to rule out endogeneity concerns. Therefore, I will exploit the policy reforms in the next
sections in a RD setup to infer the impact of prenatal employment on newborn health.
22However, Wu¨st (2015) estimates this effect on the full sample. If I re-run the OLS regression on my
full sample as described in Table 2.1 Column (1) including all parities and not only second born, I get
an increase of 46–52 percent in a preterm birth if a mother is sick, which is comparable in size to the one
reported by Wu¨st (2015).
23Table B.2 reports the entire set of coefficients for mother characteristics.
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2.6.2 First-stage Estimates
Graphical evidence. In this section, I test the first stage described in Equation (2.2). In
particular, I focus on the extensions of parental leave for the first child and the impact on
mothers’ employment status during pregnancy with her second child. Figure 2.3 graphi-
cally represents the results. Dots refer to monthly averages, to which linearly fitted values
and 95 percent confidence intervals are added.
There are statistically significant and economically meaningful discontinuities in the
direction as expected around the cutoff dates. The 1990 reform, for example, leads to
an approximate decline of 19 percentage points in the share of mothers employed during
pregnancy with the second child giving birth to their first child right after July 1990
compared to mothers that gave birth just before the policy reform. The discontinuities
for the reforms in 1996 and 2000 highlight the same pattern. When parental leave for the
first child declines, as in 1996, the share of mothers employed during pregnancy with their
second child increases by approximately 7 percentage points; it declines by 6 percentage
points with the extension of parental leave in the year 2000. The intensive margin of days
worked corroborates these patterns, where for example in 1990, a 14 percent drop of a
potential total of 160 days worked resulted in 22 fewer days worked.24
Estimation results. Table 2.4 presents regression estimates of Equation (2.2). Each
regression is estimated with a chosen bandwidth of 24 months. Columns (1), (3), and
(5) show regression results, while columns (2), (4), and (6) add mother’s characteristics
as controls. All estimates corroborate the graphical evidence found in Figure 2.3 and
confirm the statistical significance of the discontinuities in mother’s work behavior at the
cutoff. In terms of magnitude, the 1990 reform has the strongest impact in the full control
24The 160 days are the product of mothers working 32 weeks during pregnancy times 5 days per week.
The 32 weeks are the result of an average pregnancy lasting 40 weeks minus 8 weeks mothers have to
spend on maternity leave.
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Figure 2.3: RDD Plots Prenatal Employment
Panel A: Share employed during 2nd pregnancy
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Panel B: Percentage of days employed per 2nd pregnancy
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Notes: This Figure reports the fraction of mothers working during pregnancy with their second child and
the average percentage of days employed per pregnancy by month of birth of the first child. All subfigures
are based on the full sample of matched and eligible mothers that gave birth to their first child not more
than 24 months apart from a policy reform.
model on maternal employment during pregnancy with her second child, decreasing the
percentage of mothers employed and the days employed by 19.1 percentage points and
23.0 days, respectively. The corresponding numbers for the 1996 reform show an increase
of 7.2 percentage points and 9.5 days in the employment share and days worked. The 2000
reform leads to a decline of 6.4 percentage points in the percentage of mothers working
and a decline of 6.6 days in the days worked. Altogether, the documented effects are
significant, precisely estimated, and economically important.
The point estimates of the effect of having an older sibling born post-policy reform
on the work status and the days worked do not vary with the inclusion of predetermined
mother’s controls. This robustness to the inclusion of additional controls confirms the
validity of the RDD in this setting. Furthermore, the regression results are robust to
other choices of bandwidths and functional forms (see Figure B.3; Table B.3).
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2.6.3 Reduced-form Estimates
Graphical evidence. This section reports the reduced-form estimates of Equation (2.3).
In particular, I analyze the impact of the extension of parental leave for the first child on
several health outcomes for the newborn child, such as being born preterm or with low
birth weight. These reduced-form estimates can be interpreted as the net effect of the
policy reforms on newborn health. As the first-stage estimates were generally large and
statistically significant, we would expect to see sizeable effects on newborn health if there
is a relationship between the latter and a mother’s work status.
Figure 2.4 shows the effects of the policy changes on newborn health. Dots represent
monthly averages and solid lines correspond to values from a linear fit. There is no
significant discontinuity visible. This holds true for any of the outcome variables and also
for all three policy reforms. Linking these results with the discontinuous jump found for
the first-stage results of prenatal employment leads to the conclusion that my estimates are
consistent with a null hypothesis of no effect of maternal employment during pregnancy
on newborn health.
Estimation results. The graphical results are complemented with regression outputs
estimating Equation (2.3) in Table 2.5. All columns include a gender dummy, year of
birth and month of birth fixed effects. Columns (1), (3), and (5) show regression results
with child-level controls only, while columns (2), (4), and (6) add mother’s characteristics
controls. All estimates support the graphical evidence found in Figure 2.4. For all three
reforms and all newborn health outcomes, I document statistically insignificant and gen-
erally small effects. For example in 1990, the estimates allow me to rule out an increase of
more than 0.6 percentage points and a decline of more than 0.2 percentage points in the
probability of being born with low birth weight.25 Furthermore, the point estimates are
25This is the result of a 95 percent confidence interval, leading to a positive effect of a maximum of
+0.006 (=0.002+1.96*0.002) and a minimum of -0.002 (=0.002-1.96*0.002).
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Figure 2.4: RDD Plots Newborn Health
Panel A: Share low birth weight
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Notes: This Figure reports the average share of second children being born with low birth weight and
preterm by month of birth of the first child (their older sibling). Note that I introduce a shifter for
subfigure (b). Birth weight has been reported in hectograms up to December 1998. From January 1999
birth weight is measured in decagrams. This switch goes hand in hand with a discontinuous increase
in birth weight and decrease in the probability of low birth weight most likely due to a rounding down
previous to 1999. I correct for it in these graphs by multiplying birth weight observed after the shift with
the change in yearly average values from 1998 to 1999. All subfigures are based on the full sample of
matched and eligible mothers that gave birth to their first child not more than 24 months apart from a
policy reform.
not affected by the inclusion of mother’s characteristics controls. Overall, these results
indicate that the net impact of the extension of parental leave duration for the first child
and the accompanying significant reduction in prenatal employment during pregnancy
with the second child on newborn health is negligible.
2.6.4 Robustness Tests
In this section, I test the robustness of my results. For most of the reported results, I will
only focus on the 1990 reform because all conclusions hold true for the other reforms.
Alternative outcome measures. Figure 2.5 reports results on additional outcome mea-
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sures such as birth weight, gestational length, 1 min Apgar score, and a dummy for a
healthy Apgar score. As with the two main outcome measures discussed so far, there
are no visible discontinuities around the thresholds. This is convincing that there is no
effect of the reform on any newborn health measure. While preterm and low birth weight
dummies might capture effects on very vulnerable newborns, the continuous variables of
birth weight and gestational age and Apgar scores measure potentially another dimension
of newborn health.
Different birth weight and gestational age thresholds. In Figure B.4, I report the
reduced-form effect for separate regressions with different choices of birth weight and
gestational age cutoffs. While low birth weight, defined as less than 2,500 grams, and being
born preterm, defined as less than 37 weeks of gestational age, are relatively arbitrary
cutoffs, I show that the results are robust to different choices for these outcome variables.
No matter what birth weight and gestational age threshold is chosen, the effect of the
policy reforms on these birth outcomes is statistically insignificant.
Donut estimations. Panel A of Table 2.6 shows results of Donut estimations, which
create a hole in the middle of the sample. Here I exclude data points from second borns
with older siblings born within a week on both sides of the cutoff. As all policy reforms
were announced only shortly before the actual implementation, selection into motherhood
and therefore a perfect planning of birth into a specific policy regime can be ruled out.
However, the choice of a Caesarean section and therefore timing the birth might still be
possible up to a short time window of around 1 week. Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009)
investigate the issue of this narrow-window timing and argue that although there is a
steady increase in births on a day-to-day basis from June to July, there is no discontinuity
in the reported births on July 1. Also in my analysis, results are robust to this adjustment
and all conclusions hold true.
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Figure 2.5: RDD Plots Newborn Health Additional Outcome Measures
Panel A: Birth weight
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Panel D: Share with healthy Apgar score (>= 7)
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not more than 24 months apart from a policy reform.
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Adding third born. In Panel B of Table 2.6, I add the sample of third born with
an older sibling born 24 months around the cutoff of a policy reform. Although the
sample size and therefore the precision increase, Panel B detects no major changes to
the previous conclusions. Mothers are significantly less likely to work during pregnancy
with their higher-order child if facing longer parental leave with their older child. Effects
on newborn health measures for their consecutive child are still not significant. This
highlights that the results are not specific only to second borns.
Sample selection. Panel C of Table 2.6 addresses the previously raised concern of
selection into second motherhood by reporting bounds on treatment effects in the presence
of possible selection. Applying the monotonicity assumption for the 1990 reform yields
the bounds reported in Panel C in Table 2.6, where I draw the same conclusions as before.
Maternal employment during pregnancy with the second child decreases significantly with
no significant effects on newborn health for the second child.
Placebo reform 1988. In Panel D of Table 2.6, I show estimation results of a placebo
regression assuming a policy reform in July 1988. As expected, this placebo treatment in a
non reform year shows no significant effects for any of the outcome variables. Interestingly,
as this is known to be a true zero effect, I can compare the standard errors of this
specification with the results reported for the three reforms in Table 2.5. The size of
the standard errors of the two outcome measures is very similar for the placebo and the
reform regressions.
2.7 Discussion
Heterogeneity. I stratify my sample according to several different maternal characteris-
tics.26 I start by analyzing broad subsamples in which I classify mothers into blue versus
26Information about mother’s characteristics refer to the first pregnancy to mitigate possible endo-
geneity concerns.
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white collar, low versus high socioeconomic status, and married versus unmarried. Sev-
eral considerations give rise to these broad classifications. Stratification by occupational
collar, for example, allows me to differentiate between manual labor versus office work due
to its correlation with job task. A priori, it is not clear whether one would expect more
beneficial effects for one or the other, as different types of job tasks could have varying
effects over the pregnancy cycle. Job protection might favor high-SES mothers where her
skills are more attached to her current job, while paid leave might be more beneficial for
low-SES mothers. Finally, one might expect married mothers to react stronger in decreas-
ing prenatal employment due to longer leave, as they are in a stable family environment
and thus are more likely to plan subsequent fertility.
Results for these subgroups are reported in Figure 2.6 and are in line with expectations.
There are differences across subgroups with respect to prenatal maternal employment;
however, except for married versus unmarried mothers, these are not large and the effect
for each subgroup per se is sizeable and significantly different from zero. Unlike prenatal
employment, the general finding for newborn health measures across all reported sub-
groups is not statistically different from zero. Standard errors become larger for smaller
subgroups (such as unmarried mothers for example), but all estimates are relatively small
in absolute terms. The only notable difference occurs across socioeconomic status where
there is a sign switch for the effect of reduced prenatal employment on the likelihood of
a preterm birth. However, as both effects are still indistinguishable from zero, in a next
step, I refine mothers by income quintiles.
Results for mothers by income quintiles are reported in Figure 2.7. Interestingly, the
results by socioeconomic status, which were insignificant but of opposing sign, become
statistically significant despite smaller sample groups. All mothers are less likely to work
during pregnancy after the 1990 reform and show sizeable reductions in prenatal employ-
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Figure 2.6: RDD Estimates General Heterogeneity
Panel A: Work estimates
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Notes: This Figure reports in Panel A (B) parameter estimates for different specifications for the coef-
ficient γ1 (δ1) of having an older sibling born post policy reform on work status and days worked (low
birth weight and preterm). Regression coefficients with a 95 percent confidence interval are displayed.
The sample consists of all matched and eligible mothers that gave birth to their first child not more than
24 months apart from the respective policy reform.
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Figure 2.7: RDD Estimates Heterogeneity by Income Quintiles
Panel A: Work estimates
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Notes: This Figure reports in Panel A (B) parameter estimates for different specifications for the coef-
ficient γ1 (δ1) of having an older sibling born post policy reform on work status and days worked (low
birth weight and preterm). Regression coefficients with a 95 percent confidence interval are displayed.
The sample consists of all matched and eligible mothers that gave birth to their first child not more than
24 months apart from the respective policy reform.
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ment from 12.9–21.3 percentage points. The reduction in prenatal employment leads to
better outcomes for their newborns (i.e. a reduction in preterm births by 1.3 percentage
points) for mothers in the lowest income quintile and to worse outcomes for their newborns
(i.e. an increase in preterm births by 1.4 percentage points) for mothers in the highest
income quintile. These results can be explained by income effects during pregnancy. The
parental leave policy is designed as flat benefit, which describes an income improvement
for some mothers and an income decline for others. The increase in income for low-income
mothers and the reduction in preterm births is in line with previous literature (Hoynes
et al., 2015; Almond et al., 2011; Barber and Gertler, 2008; Amarante et al., 2016). More
interestingly, and also substantially less studied in the literature, is the harmful effect on
newborn health of decreasing income for high-income mothers.
While the stratification by income quintile hints toward an income effect, the effect
cannot be explained by differential occupational exposures.27 I also conduct subgroup
analysis by industry and find no significant effects on newborn health measures. This is
interesting as one might expect different types of occupations to expose mothers to differ-
ent types of risky behavior during pregnancy, as for example, smoking in the hospitality
industry or diseases in the human health and social work industry.
I also test for other heterogeneous subgroups such as gender of the child, above median
age of the mother, country of origin of the mother, and health outcomes of the preceding
child (i.e. born with low birth weight). I find a zero effect on all newborn health measures
for all of these subgroups.
Age Difference. Although the mean difference in months from the first to second born
is not affected by any of the policy reforms, certain specific age windows could be affected
by the design of the policy reforms. From a medical point of view, siblings with an age
27Results are not reported here but are available upon request.
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difference of less than 18 months are particularly interesting to look at more closely, as
this very short spacing can lead to worse outcomes of the second born (Conde-Agudelo
et al., 2006). Therefore, for a better understanding of the age difference between first-
and second-born children, I decompose the effect into respective age categories implied by
the three policy reforms. Table B.4 reports the results. An extension of parental leave as
in 1990 and 2000 reduces the likelihood of very small age differences, while a reduction in
parental leave increases the likelihood of small age differences. The effect is significant for
the 1990 and 1996 reforms. Thus, if short spacing would harm the health of the second-
born child, this would bias the effect of prenatal maternal employment on newborn health
upwards in 1990 and downwards in 1996. However, in terms of magnitude, both effects
are small.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effect of maternal employment during pregnancy on newborn
health. I use data on all Austrian births and work histories of the respective mothers.
To overcome the endogeneity of employment decisions, I exploit three policy reforms
regarding the duration of parental leave. I find no evidence that prenatal employment
affects any of the outcomes, measured via birth weight, gestational age, and Apgar scores.
This stands in contrast to the positive correlation of prenatal employment with newborn
health as reported in the OLS regressions.
For the 1990 reform, which extended parental leave from one to two years, I document
a significant 19.1 percentage point decline in the share of mothers employed during preg-
nancy with their second child and insignificant effects for all newborn health measures.
Even though prenatal employment varies substantially by subgroups, I find no evidence of
an effect on health outcomes at birth even in these subpopulations. The subgroup analysis
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by income quintiles is the only one to reveal significant effects on newborn health, which
can be explained by income effects (i.e. higher income for poorer mothers leads to better
newborn health).
This study shows that the net effect of changes in parental leave policies for the
second child is insignificant. This result is robust to the inclusion of covariates and
several different specifications. The zero effect of prenatal employment adds to the scarce
and conflicting literature on maternal employment during pregnancy on newborn health.
With increasing employment rates for pregnant women, it is crucial to understand the
mechanisms of prenatal employment on newborn health.
The literature on the effects of pregnancy conditions on long-term outcomes identi-
fies the second trimester of a pregnancy as the trimester with the strongest neural brain
development (Schwandt, 2018; Black et al., 2018). This could mean that the effect of ex-
posure to maternal labor market participation during pregnancy could only be detectable
in the long run and may not be visible on the day of birth. As such, linking prenatal
employment with long-term outcomes such as educational attainment and labor market
participation of the child itself could be explored in future studies.
The findings in this paper should interest policymakers and pregnant women. Unlike
post natal child rearing, the duty of pregnancy cannot be shared among partners. How-
ever, this should not worry mothers or employers, as there is no evidence that the working
status during pregnancy leads to bad health outcomes for the unborn baby. However, the
results should also be interpreted within the Austrian context, where women are relatively
well protected against hazardous situations at their workplace while pregnant. Further-
more, the results of this paper will help women to optimally allocate the time allowed
by parental leave policies. Several countries design their parental leave policies in such a
way that women can choose how to divide a certain amount of weeks pre- and post-birth.
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These results show that women can safely take a majority of their parental leave after
giving birth.
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Chapter 3
Baby Bonus in Switzerland:
Effects on Fertility, Newborn Health,
and Birth Scheduling
Joint with Patrick Keller
3.1 Introduction
Having children is expensive. Therefore, several family policies are put in place to support
families financially. Birth allowances, a one-time payment at the event of giving birth,
are designed specifically for the vulnerable transition from being a couple without a child
to becoming new parents. Introducing this financial support might affect two margins of
parental behavior: the short- and the long-run.
In the long-run, birth payments can affect fertility by incentivizing couples to become
parents. This is an especially important topic for countries with an aging population and
fertility rates below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. As such, it may be
in the society’s interest to boost fertility by providing financial incentives.
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In addition to that, in the short-run the announcement of a new baby bonus policy
can affect birth scheduling and consequently newborn health. Financial incentives, for
example, may motivate parents to shift a birth both forward or backward. This can have
severe long-run consequences for the unborn child, as advancing or postponing a birth
affects newborn health. Newborn health, in turn, has been linked to later-life outcomes
as summarized by Almond and Currie (2011) and more recently by Almond et al. (2018).
In this paper we study the effect of introducing, increasing, or abolishing birth pay-
ments on fertility, newborn health, and birth scheduling. For the empirical analysis we
draw on several administrative data sets from 1969 to 2017. We build several outcome
variables based on the Swiss birth register, the universe of all stillbirths, and the statis-
tics on infant deaths.1 Combining these outcome variables with cantonal information on
birth allowances allows us to study the causal impact of birth payments in the unique
quasi-experimental setting of Switzerland. Based on this, we implement a difference-in-
differences estimation. We conduct several sensitivity analyses by adjusting the baseline
estimation including only ever treated cantons, excluding early movers, and implementing
everything at the municipal level.
Family allowances in Switzerland are federally organized. However, the authorities
leave a certain degree of freedom for the exact design of the baby bonus on the cantonal
level. As such, cantons are free to choose whether they want to implement birth payments
or not. Additionally, cantons can choose the amount they want to pay at any point in
time. A birth payment is a one-time payment in the event of birth, transferred to the
mother residing in a canton that chose to pay a baby bonus. In the studied time period,
11 out of 26 cantons have a baby bonus put in place. Three of these cantons introduced
1A stillbirth is defined as a death that occurs when the baby is still in a mother’s womb. It is
differentiated from a miscarriage by meeting two criteria: First, the gestational length has to be at least
22 weeks and second, the unborn must weigh at least 500 grams. In Switzerland, every stillbirth (in
contrast to a miscarriage) has to be reported. Every death that occurs after birth and under age one is
counted as an infant death.
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a birth allowance already before the onset of the available data in 1969. Another two
cantons abolished the birth allowance after several years and all 11 cantons frequently
adjust the payment. Some of these adjustments are as high as doubling the previously
paid amount.
Our results of introducing a baby bonus in Switzerland show a positive effect on the
crude birth rate, which is significant in our specification where we include only ever treated
cantons. This positive effect is relatively smaller for first-births compared to higher-order
births, suggesting that the intensive margin of having additional children is more strongly
affected. Furthermore, we find a significant and sizable reduction in stillbirths. The birth
allowance reduces the stillbirth rate by up to 23 percent. A possible channel for this effect
could be a reduction in stress, due to the baby bonus — which might occur especially
among low-income parents. We confirm this hypothesis in our heterogeneity analysis,
where we report a stronger impact on the reduction of the stillbirth rate for older and
foreign mothers. In line with this positive health impact, we also report a significant
increase in the birth weight of around 0.6 percent evaluated at the mean. All of these
results are robust to several sensitivity checks.
Despite the impact on fertility and newborn health on the aggregate level, we do not
find birth scheduling around the policy changes. We argue that this is the result of several
features in the Swiss setting. First, changes are in absolute terms smaller than in other
countries with birth allowances. Second, most of these changes are not covered enough in
local media and third, the number of observations, i.e. the total birth count on the daily
cantonal level, may just be too little in order to document significant changes even when
combining all reforms across cantons.
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of cash transfers on fertility
behavior and to the literature on policy announcement effects on birth scheduling and
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newborn health. This literature emphasizes that parents do react to financial incentives
in adjusting the overall fertility behavior and the scheduling of births.
The most closely related birth scheduling studies by Gans and Leigh (2009); Tamm
(2013); Neugart and Ohlsson (2013); Brunner and Kuhn (2014); Borra et al. (2019) analyze
birth allowances in other countries. Gans and Leigh (2009) study the implementation (and
extension) of a large and shortly announced baby bonus in Australia in 2004 (2006). They
find sizable birth shifting with heavier babies of which a quarter were shifted more than
one week. Tamm (2013) and Neugart and Ohlsson (2013) study a shift in the German
parental leave system in 2007. They find that the reform encouraged parents to postpone
births due to higher benefits paid within the first two years after birth. Brunner and
Kuhn (2014) analyze the abolition of the baby bonus in Austria in 1997. Due to the
announcement of the policy change 10 months prior to implementation, they find a large
fertility impact in the month before the policy shift. As no health impacts on newborns
can be detected, they argue that this is rather a fertility effect than a birth scheduling
effect. Borra et al. (2019) investigate the abolition of the Spanish baby bonus in 2010.
The policy was announced seven months prior to its implementation and parents react
by shifting births forward with severe negative health consequences for their newborns.
There exist also several papers that investigate tax incentives and birth scheduling
in the United States (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra, 1999; Schulkind and Shapiro, 2014;
LaLumia et al., 2015). Using data on the universe of births in the United States for
different time periods, all of these papers show that parents are incentivized by the tax
scheme to schedule births in late December instead of early January.
More generally, there is also a large and growing strand of the literature analyzing the
impact of cash transfers on fertility behavior (Kearney, 2004; Milligan, 2005; Cohen et al.,
2013; Laroque and Salanie´, 2014). Several of these studies find a sizable impact on fertility
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when parents face financial support. Most closely related to our study is Milligan’s (2005)
analysis of a Canadian policy reform, which led to transfers up to CAD 8,000 (roughly
CHF 6,000) for the third child. He finds a strong effect on fertility. While the absolute
amount paid is significantly higher in the Canadian study, the incentive scheme differs
in the eligibility criteria. The Canadian policy mostly animates parents with an existing
two children to get a third child. Thus, this affects fertility at the intensive margin. The
Swiss transfers are substantially smaller in absolute value for all cantons, but are already
being paid for the first child. Therefore, the Swiss case allows to study fertility effects at
the extensive margin. We expect the extensive margin more difficult to affect, because
the marginal cost of an additional child are presumably decreasing.
Our paper contributes to these two strands of the literature in various ways. First,
we have a plausible control group. Due to the quasi-experimental setting in the Swiss
context, we are the first to introduce a control group: Cantons, which never introduced
any birth allowances. Previous studies always analyzed national policy changes instead
of cantonal policy changes. Our setting does not only improve the causal interpretation
of the reported estimates, it also enables us to study both short-run (birth scheduling)
and long-run (fertility responses) behavior as we can rely on a difference-in-differences
structure.
Second, we have a long time horizon. The panel structure of the data and the long
history of Swiss family allowances, allows us to study a differential impact of baby bonuses
over time. This is interesting due to a variety of reasons. Not only the institutional setting,
and thus the role of women in society has changed a lot over the last century, but also the
medical technology concerning the pregnancy and the birth itself have vastly improved.
Third, we can analyze introductions, increases, and abolitions of the baby bonus within
one country. This is of special interest in the birth scheduling analysis. The inherent
87
setting allows us to study asymmetries as the parental choice of delaying or scheduling
a birth early is a different one. While delaying a birth is unlikely to put the newborn’s
health at risk, it might not be feasible due to the natural end of a pregnancy. Inducing a
birth early, however, is feasible with the available medical interventions — at the possible
costs of compromising a baby’s health.
Finally, we can generalize the literature of cash transfers on fertility, as we can study
not only the intensive but also the extensive margin of couples becoming new parents.
Furthermore, we can study various heterogeneous effects, as the birth payment is paid
to every mother without any eligibility criteria. This stands in contrast to most of the
previous literature which analyzed fertility effects of cash transfer programs which were
targeted toward low-socioeconomic status (SES) families.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the institu-
tional background on birth allowances in Switzerland. Section 3.3 describes the data used
for the empirical analysis and Section 3.4 introduces the empirical strategy. We present
various results and sensitivity analyses on fertility and newborn health in Section 3.5
and on birth-scheduling in Section 3.6. We discuss these results in Section 3.7. Finally,
Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The Swiss Baby Bonus
Switzerland has a decentralized federalist political system. There are three interdependent
governmental levels: the federal, cantonal, and municipal level. Family allowances are
regulated on the federal level. However, each canton has the authority to adjust the local
payments individually. There are three different types of family allowances: (1) child
allowances, which by federal law since 2009 have to be at least CHF 200,2 (2) education
2The evolution of child allowances over time are depicted in Figure C.1 in the Appendix.
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allowances, which by federal law have to be at least CHF 250, and (3) the birth allowance
with no federal minimum payout. Thus, cantons are generally free to implement a baby
bonus and — if implemented — to define the amount paid. They may also increase the
baby bonus or abolish it all over at any point in time. This gives rise to large variation
across cantons.
An important difference between these benefits is that child and education allowances
are monthly money transfers while the baby bonus is a one-time payment. While the
different forms of allowances may change at the same point in time, eligibility to collect
one type of allowance varies. All mothers residing in a specific canton and giving birth
after the implementation date of the baby bonus, are eligible for the baby bonus. Thus,
there is a sharp cutoff from one day to the next. For child and education allowances,
every child eligible in a month can benefit from higher payments after a policy change.3
This is to clarify that in practice the baby bonus and the child allowance paid in the first
month after birth never offset each other.
In this paper, we will only focus on birth payments on the grounds that the unique
setup of this benefit allows us to analyze newborn health, birth scheduling, and fertility
effects. The birth payment is a unique payment to a woman who had a living birth.
Payments are also granted in case of a stillbirth after at least 23 weeks of gestation. The
birth payment is per newborn. For a multiple birth a mother can collect the baby bonus
for each child. In that case, the individual payment per child may be higher than for a
single child. The only condition, which the monetary transfer depends on, is the mother’s
canton of residence.
The baby bonus may affect two outcome margins. Mothers may want to shift their
birth in order to become or stay eligible for the birth payment. This is the short-run
3Eligibility for child and education allowances depends on the age of the child, the educational track
of the child, and the employment status of the parent.
89
margin, which may affect newborn health in case of birth scheduling. This effect is
not diluted by a change in the fertility behavior as all policy changes were announced
no more than seven months before the implementation.4 Therefore, at the time of the
announcement mothers were already pregnant. In the long-run, however, mothers might
also adjust their fertility behavior, which is the second margin of adjustment.
Birth scheduling is the result of financial incentives of introductions, increases, and
abolitions of birth payments. On the one hand, births may be delayed beyond the date
of implementation when a baby bonus is introduced or substantially increased. On the
other hand, births may be brought forward when a baby bonus is abolished. It is more
difficult to delay a birth than to schedule early, due to the natural end of every pregnancy.
There are several ways to delay labor (Coomarasamy et al., 2003; Shapiro et al., 2013;
Lima et al., 2018): One is to avoid stress or to take medication to delay labour by up to
48 hours. Another one is to postpone an already planned Caesarean section. Through a
delay, a newborn is expected to have a higher weight and length at birth, since the unborn
had more time to grow in the mother’s womb.
In the case of an abolition, mothers may want to accelerate the pregnancy. Mothers
can schedule a birth early via a Caesarean section or to induce labour medically. These
choices will lead to an earlier birth and a lighter and shorter newborn. As a consequence,
mothers have to weight financial gain against the health of their newborn.
In the long-run, higher birth allowances can increase fertility. The predominant reason
for introducing birth payments in other countries are to boost fertility. Thus, it is not
unlikely to affect fertility in Switzerland as well. This can be tested, as the cantons which
never introduced any payment can serve as control. Furthermore, the payment may also
improve newborn health. This channel is expected to be especially strong for parents
with low-socioeconomic status. For example, financially distressed parents may benefit
4See for further information on announcement and implementation dates Table C.1 in the Appendix.
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from this extra payment and negative pregnancy outcomes, such as a stillbirth, might be
prevented and positive birth outcomes, such as higher birth weight may be promoted.
3.3 Data
We base the empirical analysis on several data sources. The data on all outcome measures
such as newborn health, birth scheduling, and fertility is coming from the Swiss Vital
Statistics and Annual Population Statistics provided by the Federal Statistical Office
(FSO). The Swiss Vital Statistics comprise the three data sets on the universe of births,
stillbirths, and deaths. Information on the amount and the date of implementation of all
birth allowances per canton is recorded by the Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO).
3.3.1 Data Sources
Swiss Birth Register. The Swiss birth register covers all births from 1969 to 2017. It
contains information on the exact date of birth, sex of the child,5 and beginning in 1979,
birth outcomes, such as weight at birth and length at birth. Furthermore, it provides
information on birth order and the birth interval in months to a preceding birth if ap-
plicable. To calculate the crude birth rate per 1,000 people and the total fertility rate
per woman, the data is merged on a canton-year level with the Annual Population Statis-
tics.6 The Annual Population Statistics is generally available from 1971, with detailed
information on age-specific population starting in 1981. Thus, the crude birth rate can
be reported from 1971 onward, while the total fertility rate is only available after 1981.
5We study sex ratios as one of our outcome variables. There exist several arguments for how socioe-
conomic conditions can affect the sex ratio as summarized by Scalone and Rettaroli (2015). Improving
socioeconomic conditions can on the basis of the biological argument favor boys as the male fetus is
known to be frailer. As an evolutionary explanation better socioeconomic conditions can also lead to
more boys due to the reproductive success argument.
6We follow conventional definition to measure these two rates. The crude birth rate is the total
number of births divided by the total population multiplied by 1,000. The total fertility rate is the result
of dividing the total number of births by the total number of fertile women aged 15–49 multiplied by 35,
the total age-range.
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Additionally to the child-level characteristics, the birth certificates provide information
about the mother such as her age, marital status, citizenship, municipality, and canton
of residence. The latter variable is important for identifying the causal effect as birth
allowances are paid per canton and thus only births with non-missing information on the
canton of residence of the mother are included in the analysis.
Stillbirths and Deaths. For the determination of more severe health outcomes, we
rely on information provided in the statistics of stillbirths and deaths. As in the birth
register, these two data sets provide information on the date, municipality, and canton of
occurrence. For infants, the same maternal characteristics as before are recorded. Based
on these two measures we calculate the stillbirth and infant (< 1 year) death rate per
1,000 births.
Birth Allowances. The full history of birth allowances per canton are recorded in
several publications. From 1969 to 1992 the data were published in Zeitschrift fu¨r die
Ausgleichs-kassen. The publication AHI-Praxis covered the period from 1993 to 2004.
Starting from 2005, the data are published online on the website of the FSIO. These
publications record information on the date of implementation and the amount of the
allowance per canton. Additionally, to the date of implementation also the date of an-
nouncement is recorded. All health policy reforms were announced no more than seven
months prior to their implementation. This guarantees that around the implementation
date the only adjustable margin is birth scheduling and no fertility adjustment as mothers
were already pregnant by that time. In the long run, however, fertility can be affected —
which we will analyze.
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3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3.1. Column 1 summarizes birth measures, child
characteristics, and maternal characteristics for the overall sample. Column 2 focuses
on cantons which introduced birth allowances at some point in time. Column 3 shows
descriptive statistics for the rest of the cantons which serve as control cantons. For none
of the reported measures there is a significant difference among the treated and control
cantons. The sample of control cantons is, however, bigger than the one of treated cantons.
On average over the entire time period from 1969 to 2017, we observe around 81,000
births per year. The crude birth rate per 1,000 people in Switzerland is 11.8 and the
total fertility rate per woman 1.6. On average, 5.0 fetuses out of 1,000 births die in a
mother’s womb and 7.6 infants out of 1,000 births die within the first year. At birth
there are slightly more males (0.514) which directly translates into a sex ratio of 0.946
girls per 1 boy. The average Swiss family has a birth interval of slightly more than 3
years between children and the average birth weight of a newborn is 3,334 grams and the
average length 50 cm. Mothers are on average 29 years old when giving birth, mostly
married (91 percent) and 74 percent of them are Swiss.
Figure 3.1 shows the geographic variation in birth allowances for six different years.
Cantons with birth allowances are mostly concentrated in the French speaking part and
in the region of Central Switzerland. Certainly these treated cantons differ in various
dimensions not covered in the birth measures from the control cantons. However, if it
is the case that birth payments are introduced as a response to declining fertility, this
would work against finding a positive result and thus our estimates would constitute lower
bounds.
Figure 3.2 shows the time variation in birth allowances for all cantons that introduced
the baby bonus at some point in time. Three cantons (Geneva, Vaud, and Fribourg) have
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Full sample Treated cantons Control cantons
Overall birth measures
Total births 80,578 29,766 50,812
(per year) (7,083) (2,718) (4,727)
Crude birth rate 11.762 11.861 11.689
(per 1,000 people) (2.170) (1.963) (2.308)
Total fertility rate 1.621 1.621 1.621
(0.256) (0.180) (0.299)
Stillbirth rate 5.083 5.079 5.086
(per 1,000 births) (2.841) (2.421) (3.115)
Infant death rate 7.581 7.665 7.520
(per 1,000 births) (4.939) (4.785) (5.051)
Child characteristics
Male 0.514 0.513 0.514
Birth interval 37.550 38.311 36.992
(in months) (3.102) (2.913) (3.121)
Birth weight 3,333.551 3,319.076 3,344.166
(49.468) (56.009) (40.974)
Length 49.628 49.512 49.713
(0.441) (0.438) (0.424)
Maternal characteristics
Age of the mother 28.985 28.868 29.070
(1.586) (1.576) (1.589)
Married at birth 0.905 0.902 0.907
Swiss at birth 0.735 0.730 0.740
Observations 1,274 539 735
Notes: The full sample covers all births from 1969 to 2017. The treated cantons summarize all cantons
which ever implement a birth allowance as shown in column 2. These cantons are Fribourg, Geneva,
Jura, Lucerne, Neuchatel, Schaffhausen, Schwyz, Solothurn, Uri, Valais, and Vaud. All other cantons are
considered as control cantons and summarized in column 3. Standard errors are shown in parentheses if
necessary.
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Figure 3.1: Geographic Variation of Birth Allowances
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Notes: This Figure shows the amount of birth allowances provided per child per canton in current year
values. The focus is on geographical variation so that birth allowances are drawn for all cantons every 10
years up to the most recent year available.
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Figure 3.2: Time Variation of Birth Allowances by Treated Cantons
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Notes: This Figure shows the amount of birth allowances provided per child per canton in current year
values. It only shows the evolvement over time for those cantons which ever introduced a baby bonus
at one point in time. The ordering of the cantons is according to their introduction year of the birth
allowance.
already put baby allowances in place before 1969.7 Several cantons adjust the amount of
baby allowances over time. Some of these increases adjust for inflation, which is why in
our estimations we will include payments in 2015 Swiss francs (CHF).8 Other adjustments,
however, are unrelated to inflation and increase the prevailing amount substantially. Two
cantons (Solothurn and Schaffhausen) abolish the baby bonus after some years again.
7As the data set on the outcome measures only starts in 1969, the variation before 1969 cannot be
exploited in this paper and is therefore not shown in the graphs.
8This transformation is based on the Swiss Consumer Price Index (CPI) provided by the Federal
Statistical Office.
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3.4 Empirical Strategy
Our baseline estimation strategy for the analysis of birth allowances on fertility and new-
born health is a difference-in-differences regression where we study both the introduction
and the intensity of the treatment.
With the following baseline model, we aim at identifying the causal effect of birth
allowances on fertility and newborn health:
yct = αDct + ω
′
ctβ + γt + ζc + δc ∗ t+ θc ∗ t2 + ct (3.1)
The dependent variable, yct represents the log of the total number of births, the total
fertility rate, the crude birth rate, birth weight, the birth interval in months, the sex ratio,
the stillbirth rate, or the infant death rate in canton c and year t. Dct is either a binary
indicator for being under the regime of a baby bonus or an integer representing the actual
value (in 2015 Swiss francs) of the baby allowances in order to also study the intensity
of the treatment.9 Thus, α represents the estimated treatment effect of birth allowances
on the outcome variable. ωct is a vector of control variables to control for time-varying
confounding canton-level characteristics such as the average maternal age, marital status,
citizenship at birth, and the average value of the monthly child allowance (in 2015 Swiss
francs). Year fixed effects and canton fixed effects are denoted by γt and ζc. δc and θc
capture linear and quadratic canton-specific time trends. Finally, ct is an error term. All
estimates are weighted by number of births in the canton-year cell and standard errors
are clustered by canton.
9In an additional specification, we also include a quadratic term for the birth allowance.
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3.5 Fertility and Newborn Health Results
Our baseline results are reported in Tables 3.2–3.3. We show estimates for the different
set of outcome measures (fertility in Table 3.2 and newborn health in Table 3.3) and
three specifications. The first line shows the results for the simple dummy specification
indicating the effect of introducing the treatment. The second and third line report results
for the intensity of the treatment. We show each a linear and a quadratic specification
for the value (divided by 100) of the birth allowance.
The outcomes in Table 3.2 represent fertility measures. None of the estimates are
significant, but all clearly show a positive sign. This points toward a positive fertility
effect of the birth allowance. However, due to large standard errors we cannot reject that
there is no effect.
The outcomes in Table 3.3 study the effect on several newborn health measures. The
last two represent two severe and negative newborn health outcomes: a stillbirth and
an infant death. A negative sign of the estimate is thus a positive impact of the birth
allowance as it means a reduction in one of the two tragic events. For both the stillbirth
rate and the infant death rate we find a negative sign of the estimate, which is highly
significant in all three specifications for the stillbirth rate. Furthermore, the effect is
relatively large. For the introduction of the birth allowance, we find a reduction in the
stillbirth rate of 1.182. Interpreting this effect at the mean, this translates into a reduction
of 23 percent. Also, the coefficient on an increase of the birth allowance per CHF 100
leads to a reduction in the stillbirth rate of 0.110. This corresponds to a 2 percent decline
at the mean. Clearly, as is shown by the quadratic specification estimates, returns to an
additional CHF 100 are declining.
In line with the reduction of the two negative health measures, Table 3.3 reports a
positive and significant health impact on birth weight. While the baby bonus increases
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Table 3.2: Main Estimation Results: Fertility Outcomes
Dependent variable
Log of total
births
Total fertility
rate
Crude birth
rate
Dummy specification
Birth allowance (dummy)=1 0.0336 0.0302 0.310
(0.0291) (0.0324) (0.334)
Linear value specification
Birth allowance (value/100) 0.00213 -0.00115 0.0325
(0.00340) (0.00418) (0.0391)
Quadratic value specification
Birth allowance (value/100) 0.00970 0.00799 0.100
(0.00649) (0.00665) (0.0720)
Birth allowance (quadratic) -0.000416 -0.000419 -0.00371
(0.000324) (0.000290) (0.00360)
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.515 1.621 11.762
Observations 1,263 962 1,213
Notes: This Table is estimated on the full sample of control and treated cantons. Robust and clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses. All estimates are weighted by number of births in the canton-
year cell. Significance at the 99%/95%/90% level is indicated with ***/**/*. We report the coefficient α
on the treatment dummy/intensity Dct of Equation (3.1) where we control for time-varying canton-level
characteristics, year and canton fixed effects, and linear and quadratic canton-specific time trends. In
the intensity specifications, we include the value divided by 100 in 2015 Swiss francs.
birth weight by 21 grams, this, however, corresponds to a relatively small impact of 0.6
percent at the mean. Neither the sex ratio nor the birth interval in months from one birth
to another are significantly affected.
In a next step we show results for the specification where we only include ever treated
cantons in Tables 3.4–3.5. In this specification the identification solely relies on variation
in the timing of the policy changes. Qualitatively the results are very much in line with our
baseline specification where we include all cantons. However, compared to the previous
results the positive effect of birth allowances on the log of total births and the crude birth
rate turn significant. The point estimate for the log of total births is 0.061 and for the
crude birth rate 0.563. The first estimate can directly be interpreted as a 6.1 percent
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Table 3.4: Including Only Ever Treated Cantons: Fertility Outcomes
Dependent variable
Log of total
births
Total fertility
rate
Crude birth
rate
Dummy specification
Birth allowance (dummy)=1 0.0610*** 0.00373 0.563**
(0.0190) (0.0314) (0.225)
Linear value specification
Birth allowance (value/100) 0.00216 -0.00608 0.0253
(0.00322) (0.00494) (0.0367)
Quadratic value specification
Birth allowance (value/100) 0.0132** 0.00154 0.127**
(0.00434) (0.00565) (0.0518)
Birth allowance (quadratic) -0.000614** -0.000358 -0.00570*
(0.000229) (0.000409) (0.00290)
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.609 1.621 11.861
Observations 528 407 508
Notes: This Table is estimated solely on ever treated cantons. Robust and clustered standard errors
are reported in parentheses. All estimates are weighted by number of births in the canton-year cell.
Significance at the 99%/95%/90% level is indicated with ***/**/*. We report the coefficient α on
the treatment dummy/intensity Dct of Equation (3.1) where we control for time-varying canton-level
characteristics, year and canton fixed effects, and linear and quadratic canton-specific time trends. In
the intensity specifications, we include the value divided by 100 in 2015 Swiss francs.
increase, while the second estimate evaluated at the mean shows a 4.7 percent increase
in the crude birth rate due to the introduction of the baby bonus. Furthermore, the
first CHF 100 increase both outcomes by roughly 1 percent. Similarly to the baseline
specification, the effect on stillbirths is significant and negative. The point estimate of
-0.888 is slightly smaller, but still refers to a 17.5 percent decline at the mean in the
overall stillbirth rate. Also the positive impact of 15.28 grams on birth weight is in line
with the previously reported results.
Finally, as we are interested in the effect on both the extensive and the intensive
margin, we narrow our analysis and focus solely on the crude birth rate. We choose this
variable as it is available for a longer time horizon than the total fertility rate and it still
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Table 3.6: Including Only Ever Treated Cantons: Birth Order Analysis
Dependent variable
Crude birth
rate (cbr)
1st-child
cbr
2nd-child
cbr
3d-child
cbr
Dummy specification
Birth allowance (dummy)=1 0.563** 0.265** 0.210** 0.119**
(0.225) (0.115) (0.0730) (0.0416)
Linear value specification
Birth allowance (value/100) 0.0253 0.0185 0.0109 0.00196
(0.0367) (0.0152) (0.0119) (0.00764)
Quadratic value specification
Birth allowance (value/100) 0.127** 0.0527* 0.0458** 0.0280***
(0.0518) (0.0246) (0.0174) (0.00856)
Birth allowance (quadratic) -0.00570* -0.00192 -0.00196 -0.00147**
(0.00290) (0.00116) (0.00109) (0.000565)
Mean of Dep. Var. 11.861 4.677 4.022 1.462
Observations 508 508 508 508
Notes: This Table is estimated solely on ever treated cantons. Robust and clustered standard errors
are reported in parentheses. All estimates are weighted by number of births in the canton-year cell.
Significance at the 99%/95%/90% level is indicated with ***/**/*. We report the coefficient α on
the treatment dummy/intensity Dct of Equation (3.1) where we control for time-varying canton-level
characteristics, year and canton fixed effects, and linear and quadratic canton-specific time trends. In
the intensity specifications, we include the value divided by 100 in 2015 Swiss francs.
allows us to study the impact by birth order which we report in Table 3.6. Column 1
in Table 3.6 replicates column 3 from Table 3.4. Columns 2–4 of Table 3.6 create new
outcome measures taking into account the birth order so that, for example, column 2
reports the effect on first births, i.e. the extensive margin, while columns 3–4 show the
effect on the intensive margin.
Interestingly, the effect is positive and significant for all outcomes. Point estimates
on first, second, and third crude birth rates are 0.265, 0.210, and 0.119, respectively.
Interpreted at the mean, these estimates correspond to an increase of 5.6 percent, 5.2
percent, and 8.1 percent. This shows that both the extensive and the intensive margin
are affected. In relative terms, however, it is especially the intensive margin that reacts.
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Robustness. We conduct several robustness analyses. Results are reported in the
Appendix. Here, we briefly describe the general findings in what follows.
Tables C.2–C.3 in the Appendix10 show results for the specification where we exclude
cantons that already had a baby bonus in place before the onset of data availability. This
is to ensure that the trends in fertility in these cantons are not driving the results. Thus,
in this specification we exclude the cantons of Geneva, Vaud, and Fribourg. Results are
very similar both qualitatively and quantitatively to the baseline specification.
Additionally, to estimating everything on the canton-year level, we also conduct sen-
sitivity analyses by estimating everything at the municipality-year level. These results
are reported in Tables C.4–C.5. The variation in the treatment is solely coming from the
cantonal level, so that — unsurprisingly — the results are similar. However, due to the
increase in sample size we gain significance for the effect on the log of births and the crude
birth rate in the linear value specification.
Due to the differential treatment time and various intensity treatment changes over
time, it is not straightforward to test for parallel trends. To address this issue we also
report estimates for including Dc(t+1) in Equation (3.1). Conditional on including the
current value effect Dct, Dc(t+1) should not contain any significant information, which is
confirmed and reported in Tables C.6–C.7.
10All following Figures and Tables denoted by C are reported in the Appendix: Chapter 3.
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3.6 Birth Scheduling Results
In Figure 3.3 we report the graphical results of our birth scheduling analysis. They are
represented in an event study design where we first collapse our individual level data on
the daily level and then regress the following equation:
Yimyc = α + βc + γy + δm + ζi + imyc, (3.2)
where Yimyc is the total (log) count of births per day i, in month m, in year y, and canton
c. With βc we include canton fixed effects, and with γy and δm year and month fixed
effects, respectively. ζi are, depending on the specification, day-of-week or day-of-year
fixed effects. Based on this, we calculate residuals from a linear prediction and plot these
residuals for the 60 days around the policy change. We show the effect individually for
introductions, increases of above CHF 200, and the abolition of the baby bonus where we
pool over the same event across cantons and time.
For none of the three events (introduction, increase, and abolition), there is a clear
pattern around the policy change. This holds true for both specifications reported in Panel
A (day-of-week fixed effects) and Panel B (day-of-year fixed effects) and for both the total
count of births per day as shown in Figure 3.3 and the log of the outcome variable as
shown in Figure C.2. If anything, there is a slight decline in births after an increase in the
baby bonus of more than CHF 200, which would contradict our expectations. However,
due to the general noisy movement of daily births, this effect seems not systematic.
To understand the absence of birth scheduling in the Swiss case, which stands in
contrast to the results in the literature, we try to understand the reasons. Therefore, we
also check newspaper articles for media coverage of the baby bonus policy changes. For
this we search for articles about birth allowances in LexisNexis and the archives of several
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Figure 3.3: Birth Scheduling Event Study
Panel A: Controlling for day-of-week fixed effects
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Panel B: Controlling for day-of-year fixed effects
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Notes: This Figure shows the residuals (in dashed black line) from a linear prediction of estimating
Equation (3.2) of total births per day and a linear fit including a 95% confidence interval (in blue) for the
week before and after the policy change. Panel A reports the residual when ζi controls for day-of-week
fixed effects and Panel B when ζi controls for day-of-year fixed effects. The three event studies combine
either all introductions, increases above CHF 200, or abolitions across cantons and time.
newspapers.11 In general, media coverage is relatively low. This is especially true for
increases of the baby bonus. Thus it is not surprising, that birth scheduling in general is
not taking place.
Nevertheless, there is an exception. In 2012, the canton of Geneva doubled the amount
paid from CHF 1,000 to CHF 2,000. This increase was the result of a cantonal referendum
initiated by the political left. By the very nature of this policy change, this led to a lot
of discussion and widespread information exchange. Thus, we decided to look in more
detail at this specific increase, which is depicted in Figure 3.4. Both the total number
of births and the residuals calculated as before show clearly, that there is an increase in
births happening after the policy change. However, also for the specific case of Geneva,
the baseline daily count of births is so low that in a standard regression analysis this effect
11These newspapers include Tages Anzeiger, Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, Blick, St. Galler Tagblatt,
24heures, and Le Temps.
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Figure 3.4: Birth Scheduling Geneva: Policy Change on January 1st 2012
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Notes: This Figure shows the daily count of total births (left axis) and the residuals (right axis) from a
linear prediction of estimating Equation (3.2) of total births per day. Additionally, a linear fit is added
including a 95% confidence interval (in blue) for the week before and after the policy change. ζi controls
for day-of-week fixed effects for the canton of Geneva. The 60 day window reports the 30 days pre- and
post policy change (black vertical line) on January 1st 2012, where the baby bonus got doubled from
CHF 1,000 to CHF 2,000 due to a public initiative.
does not reach significance.
Summarizing the analysis of birth scheduling, there seem to be only marginal behav-
ioral effects of parents when it comes to rescheduling a birth. This is most likely the
result of relatively low media coverage and small changes in the payment structure. In
the specific case of Geneva in 2012, where parents were both informed and the baby bonus
was doubled to CHF 2000, graphical analysis suggests a postponement of births into the
new year. But also in this case, due to the small amount of daily births this effect is hard
to significantly document in a consistent way.
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3.7 Discussion
To discuss the robust and significant decline on the stillbirth rate, we want to provide some
more background information on stillbirths, which are graphically depicted in Figure C.3.
Stillbirths have almost halved over the last 50 years, starting by slightly less than 10
stillbirths per 1,000 births in 1970 and moving downward to a bit above five stillbirths per
1,000 births nowadays. At the beginning of the described time period there were substan-
tial differences among younger versus older mothers, foreign versus Swiss mothers, and
unmarried versus married mothers. The gap between all of these groups has substantially
decreased over time. Unfortunately, no other proxies for low-SES are available in the
birth statistics.
The medical literature has identified various risk factors for a stillbirth (McClure
et al., 2006, 2009; Bukowski R, 2011; Flenady et al., 2011; Silver, 2011; Varner et al.,
2014). These factors can broadly be classified into four categories: (i) maternal charac-
teristics, (ii) maternal medical conditions, (iii) maternal reproductive history, and (iv)
fetal characteristics. Among (i) maternal characteristics, low-SES is one of the predomi-
nant drivers for a stillbirth and among (iii) maternal reproductive history, a first birth is
more correlated with a stillbirth than a higher-order birth.
Both of these two stated drivers can explain the results we find. The financial support
in form of a birth payment of up to CHF 2,000 may matter a lot for a low-SES mother.
While raising a child up to age 20 is estimated to cost roughly CHF 200,000, a one percent
transfer may seem negligible (NZZ, 2014). However, according to an estimation by Ming
(2012) roughly CHF 3,500 are already spent on the newborn during pregnancy. Relative
to these costs, the prospect of being paid CHF 2,000 upon arrival of the newborn may
reduce stress during pregnancy tremendously and thus reduce the likelihood of a stillbirth.
Furthermore, these CHF 2,000 may be especially important for low-SES mothers which
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Table 3.7: Stillbirth Results: Heterogeneity Analysis
Dependent variable
Stillbirth
rate
Stillbirth
rate
Stillbirth
rate
Stillbirth
rate
Dummy specification
Birth allowance (dummy)=1 -1.176*** -0.956*** -1.276*** -1.152***
(0.216) (0.264) (0.289) (0.244)
Interaction above age average=1 -0.563***
(0.165)
Interaction above Swiss average=1 0.463
(0.362)
Interaction above married average=1 -0.0595
(0.176)
Linear value specification
Birth allowance (value/100) -0.112** -0.0994** -0.123** -0.112**
(0.0464) (0.0480) (0.0463) (0.0494)
Interaction above age average=1 -0.0394***
(0.0113)
Interaction above Swiss average=1 0.0357*
(0.0196)
Interaction above married average=1 -0.000370
(0.0173)
Mean of Dep. Var 5.489 5.489 5.489 5.489
Observations 103,919 103,919 103,919 103,919
Notes: This Table is estimated on the full sample of control and treated cantons. The observational
unit in this specification is at the municipal level. Robust and clustered standard errors are reported in
parentheses. All estimates are weighted by number of births in the municipality-year cell. Significance
at the 99%/95%/90% level is indicated with ***/**/*. We report the coefficient α on the treatment
dummy/intensity Dct of Equation (3.1) and the interaction term with the stated heterogeneous group
where we control for time-varying municipality-level characteristics, year and municipality fixed effects,
and linear and quadratic canton-specific time trends. In the intensity specifications, we include the value
divided by 100 in 2015 Swiss francs.
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are less likely to be employed and thus not eligible for child allowances later on.
We support this argumentation by providing a heterogeneity analysis of the stillbirth
results by characteristics of the mother, such as her age, her country of origin, and her
marital status.12 These results are shown in Table 3.7. For simplicity we only show the
results for the dummy and the linear value specification. Both highlight that older mothers
and those with a foreign background benefit more from birth allowances. There is no
significant difference by marital status. Nevertheless, these results support the hypothesis
that it is the mothers with lower socioeconomic background that gain significantly more
from the introduction and higher payment of the baby bonus.
Additionally to this first mechanism, we also find a relative stronger fertility impact
on higher-order births as shown in Table 3.6, which face a lower risk of stillbirth. These
two factors combined may explain the very large and significant effect on the stillbirth
rate we document across all our specifications.
Furthermore we are interested in the evolution of the effect over time. Due to the
sample size and the structure of the policy changes (i.e. introductions of baby bonus take
place relatively early) we concentrate on the linear value specification and split the sample
in half to show an estimate for the period 1969–1993 and another one for 1994–2017. These
results are shown in Figure 3.5. They show that the significant reduction in the stillbirth
rate by 0.110 for an additional CHF 100 are entirely driven by the first period ranging
from 1969–1993. Thereafter the point estimate becomes positive and insignificant.
12We also conduct the heterogeneity analysis of the crude birth rate with respect to the same subgroups,
which is available upon request. We find that an additional CHF 100 increase the crude birth rate
significantly more for younger and foreign mothers.
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Figure 3.5: The Effect on the Stillbirth Rate Over Time: Linear Value Specification
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Notes: This Figure shows the point estimate of birth allowances on the stillbirth rate including the 95%
confidence interval. This corresponds to estimating the linear value specification of Equation (3.1). We
show the estimate for the entire sample and then for the two periods when we split the sample.
3.8 Conclusion
We exploit a unique quasi-experimental setting in Switzerland that allows us to study the
effect of birth allowances on fertility, newborn health, and birth scheduling. In Switzer-
land, cantons are free to implement birth allowances and may choose the value paid. This
gives rise to a lot of cantonal variation which we use in a difference-in-differences setting
where we can test in our baseline specification both for the introduction but also the
intensity of the treatment. Based on administrative data on births, stillbirths, and infant
deaths, we can then analyze various outcome measures — the crude birth rate, the fer-
tility rate, and several newborn health measures. Furthermore, to study birth scheduling
we employ a graphical event study analysis on the basis of daily birth counts. This allows
us to understand, whether parents are willing to shift births due to financial incentives.
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We do not find evidence for birth scheduling, i.e. parents do neither postpone nor
shift forward a birth as a reaction to an introduction or abolition of a baby bonus. We
argue, that this is the result of several features, such as in general only small changes in
the amount paid, low media coverage of any of the changes, and a relatively small sample
size on the cantonal daily level.
In the long-run, however, when studying the impact on fertility and newborn health,
we provide evidence for a positive impact on both margins. We find an increase of the
crude birth rate of around 3 percent for introducing birth payments and 0.3 percent for
every additional CHF 100 paid. This effect becomes significant in the specification, where
we include only ever treated cantons and thus solely rely on the variation in treatment
timing. With a fertility rate of 1.6 — well below the replacement rate of 2.1 — this is an
encouraging result for Switzerland.
Furthermore, we report a significant decline in the stillbirth rate and an increase in
birth weight. While the latter effect is relatively small, the decline in the stillbirth rate is
substantial. The introduction of the baby bonus leads to a significant decline of 23 percent
evaluated at the mean. An additional CHF 100 reduce the stillbirth rate by 2 percent,
though, the quadratic specification shows that this effect has diminishing marginal returns.
Investigating this further, we find that the reduction in the stillbirth rate is particularly
strong for older or foreign mothers, and that the effect is entirely driven by increases in
the birth allowances in the first half of the observation period, i.e. 1969–1993.
This paper confirms that parents react to financial incentives by adjusting their fertility
behavior. In addition to the previous literature on birth allowances, we also find that
the stillbirth rate — a very severe and negative newborn health outcome — is strongly
affected. This result is interesting for policy makers, as it suggests, that birth allowances
may affect societies beyond the direct effect of fertility adjustments.
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Appendix: Chapter 1
Figure A.1: Additional Health Outcomes Observable in ASSD
Panel A: 1990 Reform
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Table A.1: Covariate Balance Test
Dependent variable
Maternal age
at birth Married High-wage
Foreign
origin
1990 Reform
RDD-DiD −0.0463 −0.0319*** 0.0156 0.0001
(0.0773) (0.00457) (0.0362) (0.0134)
Mean of Dep. Var. 26.180 0.742 0.549 0.056
Observations 13,313 13,313 13,313 13,313
1996 Reform
RDD-DiD 0.262** 0.0420*** 0.0584*** 0.0287**
(0.0771) (0.00780) (0.00965) (0.00998)
Mean of Dep. Var. 27.518 0.705 0.544 0.109
Observations 14,162 14,162 14,162 14,162
2000 Reform
RDD-DiD −0.192 0.0219 −0.0246** −0.00879
(0.280) (0.0114) (0.00665) (0.0179)
Mean of Dep. Var. 28.362 0.655 0.562 0.123
Observations 12,383 12,383 12,383 12,383
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table provides parameter estimates for the coefficient β1 of Equation (1.1).
Each reform is individually estimated. The sample includes all mothers within a band-
width of three months in a reform year and the preceding non-reform year, to control
for seasonality around the policy cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
running variable.
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Table A.2: Robustness: Placebo Analysis
Dependent variable
Outpatient
costs
GP
costs
Medication
costs
Days of
hospitalizations
1992 Reform
RDD-DiD −215.8* −4.071***−164.8 −1.057*
(91.97) (0.755) (109.2) (0.501)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2390.628 292.656 653.735 7.758
Observations 14,749 14,749 14,749 14,749
1994 Reform
RDD-DiD −23.46 −11.05 −38.84 −2.106
(73.60) (11.90) (42.33) (1.250)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2319.359 289.359 606.257 7.979
Observations 15,179 15,179 15,179 15,179
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table provides parameter estimates for the coefficient β1 of Equation (1.1).
Each placebo reform is individually estimated. The sample includes all mothers within a
bandwidth of three months in a placebo reform year and the preceding placebo non-reform
year, to control for seasonality around the policy cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at
the level of the running variable. Health outcomes are accumulated over time up to 2007,
so that birth occurred 15/13 years ago for the placebo reform in 1992/1994.
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Table A.3: Estimates on General Health Outcomes: Including Covariates
Dependent variable
Outpatient
costs
GP
costs
Medication
costs
Days of
hospitalizations
1990 Reform
RDD-DiD −290.5* 42.09 −336.1*** 2.735**
(135.1) (35.56) (71.78) (0.818)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2422.887 314.097 665.960 8.227
Observations 13,313 13,313 13,313 13,313
1996 Reform
RDD-DiD −302.1 −15.79 −361.4* 0.587
(168.7) (20.31) (163.0) (0.774)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2371.067 271.462 631.638 7.589
Observations 14,162 14,162 14,162 14,162
2000 Reform
RDD-DiD 262.2* −35.66*** 175.1 −3.697**
(103.2) (6.290) (98.75) (1.218)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2354.290 257.068 424.966 15.126
Observations 12,383 12,383 12,383 12,383
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table provides parameter estimates for the coefficient β1 of Equation (1.1)
additionally controlling for maternal characteristics (age, marital status, origin, and high-
wage). Each reform is individually estimated. The sample includes all mothers within a
bandwidth of three months in a reform year and the preceding non-reform year, to control
for seasonality around the policy cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
running variable. Health outcomes are accumulated over time up to 2007, so that birth
occurred 17/11/7 years ago for the reform in 1990/1996/2000.
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Table A.4: Robustness of 1990 Reform: Bandwidth Choice
Bandwidth 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months
Dep. var.
Outpatient costs
RDD-DiD −290.6* −272.0** −84.70 −85.49
(140.2) (107.3) (172.6) (137.6)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2422.887 2411.598 2446.584 2454.173
Observations 13,313 17,842 21,979 26,385
Dep. var.
GP costs
RDD-DiD 41.44 −11.59 27.37 13.40
(36.45) (28.49) (31.38) (27.94)
Mean of Dep. Var. 314.097 299.047 304.724 307.861
Observations 13,313 17,842 21,979 26,385
Dep. var.
Medication costs
RDD-DiD −337.4*** −292.1*** −142.1 −109.9
(70.27) (75.81) (128.9) (107.4)
Mean of Dep. Var. 665.960 668.325 695.553 694.297
Observations 13,313 17,842 21,979 26,385
Dep. var.
Days of hospitalizations
RDD-DiD 2.764* 1.130 1.853 1.696
(0.817) (0.913) (0.985) (0.831)
Mean of Dep. Var. 8.227 7.883 7.928 8.125
Observations 13,313 17,842 21,979 26,385
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table provides parameter estimates for the coefficient β1 of Equation (1.1).
The sample includes all mothers within a bandwidth of 3–6 months as shown in Columns
1–4 in the reform year 1990 and the preceding non-reform year 1989, to control for sea-
sonality around the policy cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the running
variable. Health outcomes are accumulated over time up to 2007, so that birth occurred
17 years ago.
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Table A.5: Robustness of 1996 Reform: Bandwidth Choice
Bandwidth 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months
Dep. var.
Outpatient costs
RDD-DiD −275.3 6.808 4.488 −61.78
(170.2) (155.2) (155.0) (162.7)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2371.067 2341.923 2322.856 2316.299
Observations 14,162 18,978 23,608 28,323
Dep. var.
GP costs
RDD-DiD −11.02 7.504 2.940 −14.47
(21.89) (26.25) (24.64) (23.74)
Mean of Dep. Var. 271.462 267.631 267.201 266.124
Observations 14,162 18,978 23,608 28,323
Dep. var.
Medication costs
RDD-DiD −350.8* −163.8 −142.1 −165.7
(163.0) (120.1) (125.1) (132.4)
Mean of Dep. Var. 631.638 616.824 598.491 596.071
Observations 14,162 18,978 23,608 28,323
Dep. var.
Days of hospitalizations
RDD-DiD 0.520 2.577 2.565 1.612
(0.765) (1.534) (1.294) (1.042)
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.589 7.789 7.863 7.754
Observations 14,162 18,978 23,608 28,323
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table provides parameter estimates for the coefficient β1 of Equation (1.1).
The sample includes all mothers within a bandwidth of 3–6 months as shown in Columns
1–4 in the reform year 1996 and the preceding non-reform year 1995, to control for sea-
sonality around the policy cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the running
variable. Health outcomes are accumulated over time up to 2007, so that birth occurred
11 years ago.
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Table A.6: Robustness of 2000 Reform: Bandwidth Choice
Bandwidth 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months
Dep. var.
Outpatient costs
RDD-DiD 255.1** 189.6* 327.0*** 290.0***
(96.15) (97.91) (82.00) (91.27)
Mean of Dep. Var. 2354.290 2384.973 2399.973 2405.945
Observations 12,383 16,423 20,212 24,179
Dep. var.
GP costs
RDD-DiD −36.31*** −19.66 −11.01 −11.01
(5.540) (10.60) (10.49) (9.310)
Mean of Dep. Var. 257.068 263.054 261.605 261.294
Observations 12,383 16,423 20,212 24,179
Dep. var.
Medication costs
RDD-DiD 171.6 203.2** 259.5*** 214.1***
(91.91) (62.38) (59.69) (63.83)
Mean of Dep. Var. 424.966 439.364 458.809 468.719
Observations 12,383 16,423 20,212 24,179
Dep. var.
Days of hospitalizations
RDD-DiD −3.718* −2.718* −1.063 −0.930
(1.260) (0.935) (1.135) (0.991)
Mean of Dep. Var. 15.126 15.009 15.021 14.926
Observations 12,383 16,423 20,212 24,179
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table provides parameter estimates for the coefficient β1 of Equation (1.1).
The sample includes all mothers within a bandwidth of 3–6 months as shown in Columns
1–4 in the reform year 2000 and the preceding non-reform year 1999, to control for sea-
sonality around the policy cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the running
variable. Health outcomes are accumulated over time up to 2007, so that birth occurred 7
years ago.
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Appendix: Chapter 2
Figure B.1: Second Children Born Within Parental Leave and Grace Period
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Notes: This Figure shows the fraction of first born in families with at least two children that have a
younger sibling that is born within the parental leave and grace period. Dots refer to the percentage of
second children born within the parental leave period of the first child. Triangles refer to the percentage
of second children born within the grace period after the parental leave period of the first child. Squares
refer to the sum of both. The solid vertical lines refer to the three policy changes, increasing the latest
consecutive birth date to 27.5 months in July 1990, decreasing it to 21.5 months in July 1996 and raising
it again to 33.5 months in July 2000. The data consists of the full matched and eligible sample of mothers
with at least two children.
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Figure B.2: RDD Plots Covariates
Panel A: Maternal age
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Panel B: Share married
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Panel C: Share low SES
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Panel D: Share foreign origin
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Notes: This Figure reports the composition of mothers giving birth to their second child by month of
birth of the first child. All subfigures are based on the full sample of matched and eligible mothers that
gave birth to their first child not more than 24 months apart from a policy reform.
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Figure B.3: Robustness to Different Choices of Bandwidths
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Panel C: 2000
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Notes: This Figure reports the robustness of the RDD estimate on the work status and the days employed
from Equation (2.2) to different choices of bandwidths. The solid line refers to the point estimate of
separate equations, and the dashed lines indicate the corresponding 95 percent confidence interval. Panel
A and C refer to the increase in parental leave duration in July 1990 and July 2000, respectively. Panel B
shows the policy reform in July 1996, where parental leave duration declined. All Panels were estimated
using the full sample of matched and eligible mothers.
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Figure B.4: RDD Estimates for Different Thresholds: 1990 Reform
Panel A: Birth weight
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Notes: This Figure reports parameter estimates for the coefficient δ1 in Equation (2.3). In Panel A
(B) for every 100 grams (week) a separate regression is estimated, corresponding to another birth weight
(gestational age) threshold than the one used in the paper of 2,500 grams (37 weeks). 95 percent confidence
intervals are shown by vertical lines. All estimates are based on regressions including the full set of
controls. The sample consists of all matched and eligible mothers that gave birth to their first child not
more than 24 months apart from the policy reform in July 1990.
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Table B.1: Covariate Balance Test
1990 1996 2000
Panel A: Dependent variable maternal age
1{Post policy reform} -0.032 -0.096 -0.004
(0.059) (0.062) (0.072)
Comparison Mean 27.412 28.735 28.822
Panel B: Dependent variable married
1{Post policy reform} -0.003 0.006 −0.014∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Comparison Mean 0.801 0.763 0.719
Panel C: Dependent variable share low SES
1{Post policy reform} 0.008 0.005 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Comparison Mean 0.522 0.456 0.432
Panel D: Dependent variable share foreign origin
1{Post policy reform} 0.007∗ -0.006 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Comparison Mean 0.073 0.144 0.152
Observations 87,566 77,279 63,481
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table is estimated on the matched and eligible sample of second born with
an older sibling born within a bandwidth of 24 months around the policy reforms. The
1{post policy reform} coefficient estimate reports the impact of a first birth just after the
policy reform versus just before.
133
Table B.2: OLS Results on Preterm and Low Birth Weight:
Full Set of Controls
Dependent Variable Preterm Low birth weight
Panel A: Work status
Worked −0.0020∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0023∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Sick 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Married −0.0056∗∗∗ −0.0094∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010)
Foreign 0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0012)
Aged 20-24 −0.0185∗∗∗ −0.0184∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0048)
Aged 25-29 −0.0202∗∗∗ −0.0214∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0048)
Aged 30-34 −0.0149∗∗∗ −0.0173∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0048)
Aged 35-39 -0.0027 -0.0027
(0.0050) (0.0051)
Aged 40-45 0.0139∗ 0.0110
(0.0074) (0.0074)
Low SES 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Notes: This Table continues on the next page.
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Table B.2 continued: OLS Results on Preterm and Low Birth Weight:
Full Set of Controls
Dependent Variable Preterm Low birth weight
Panel B: Days worked
Days worked −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Sick 0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Married −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0092∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010)
Foreign 0.0045∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0012)
Aged 20-24 −0.0176∗∗∗ −0.0177∗∗∗
((11.0632)) (0.0048)
Aged 25-29 −0.0185∗∗∗ −0.0201∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0048)
Aged 30-34 −0.0126∗∗∗ −0.0155∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0048)
Aged 35-39 -0.0001 -0.0008
(0.0050) (0.0051)
Aged 40-45 0.0165∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0074)
Low SES 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Mother Controls No Yes No Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.0335 0.0335 0.0327 0.0327
Observations 226,824 226,824 226,824 226,824
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Notes: This Table is estimated on the pooled sample of the three RDD regression
windows. Additional controls included in all columns are year and month of birth FE,
and a gender dummy. Mother’s characteristic controls are dummies for 5 year age
brackets, marital status, a dummy for low SES (combined from educational and wage
data) and a foreign origin dummy.
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Table B.4: Age Differences in Detail
1990 sample 1996 sample 2000 sample
0–18 months −0.040∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
0–36 months 0.021∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.007
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
0–120 months 0.004∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
0–16 months −0.030∗∗∗
(0.004)
17–28 months 0.057∗∗∗
(0.006)
29–120 months −0.023∗∗∗
(0.007)
0–22 months 0.046∗∗∗
(0.006)
23–28 months −0.050∗∗∗
(0.005)
29–120 months 0.009
(0.007)
0–22 months −0.031∗∗∗
(0.007)
23–34 months 0.018∗∗
(0.007)
35–120 months 0.013∗
(0.008)
Observations 87,413 76,943 63,134
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses.
Notes: This Table is estimated on the matched and eligible sample of
second born with an older sibling born within a bandwidth of 24 months
around the policy reforms. This table reports the 1{post policy reform}
parameter estimate on the respective age difference between first and sec-
ond born child. All columns include mother’s characteristic controls for 5
year age brackets, marital status, a dummy for low SES (combined from
educational and wage data) and a foreign origin dummy.
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Appendix: Chapter 3
Figure C.1: Monthly Child Allowances per Canton
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Notes: This Figure shows the amount of child allowances provided per child per month per canton in
current year values.
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Figure C.2: Birth Scheduling Log Specification Event Study
Panel A: Controlling for day-of-week fixed effects
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Panel B: Controlling for day-of-year fixed effects
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Notes: This Figure shows the residuals (in dashed black line) from a linear prediction of estimating
Equation (3.2) of the log of total births per day and a linear fit including a 95% confidence interval (in
blue) for the week before and after the policy change. Panel A reports the residual when ζi controls
for day-of-week fixed effects and Panel B when ζi controls for day-of-year fixed effects. The three event
studies combine either all introductions, increases above CHF 200, or abolitions across cantons and time.
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Figure C.3: Stillbirths in Switzerland
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Notes: This Figure shows the stillbirth rate per 1,000 births once for the overall population, and then
each by origin, maternal age, and maternal marital status.
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Table C.1: Overview Policy Changes in Detail
Canton
Announcement
Date
Implementation
Date
Geneva 14.03.1969 01.05.1969
Fribourg 15.12.1970 01.01.1971
Vaud 27.11.1972 01.01.1973
Geneva 12.06.1973 01.07.1973
Fribourg 24.09.1973 01.01.1974
Schwyz 09.05.1974 01.07.1974
Fribourg 29.10.1974 01.01.1975
Schwyz 05.12.1975 01.01.1976
Schywz 25.09.1977 01.01.1978
Valais 01.12.1977 01.01.1978
Solothurn 12.06.1978 01.01.1979
Geneva 12.10.1978 01.01.1979
Fribourg 10.10.1978 01.07.1979
Vaud 18.09.1979 01.01.1980
Uri 28.09.1980 01.01.1981
Lucerne 10.03.1980 01.07.1981
Vaud 13.11.1981 01.01.1982
Schaffhausen 24.06.1982 01.07.1982
Geneva 07.03.1982 01.07.1982
Valais 12.11.1982 01.01.1983
Schwyz 20.10.1983 01.01.1984
Vaud 12.12.1983 01.01.1984
Valais 16.11.1984 01.01.1985
Geneva 15.02.1985 01.04.1985
Fribourg 25.09.1985 01.01.1986
Uri 08.10.1985 01.01.1986
Geneva 25.06.1986 01.01.1987
Neuchatel 20.10.1986 01.01.1987
Lucerne 14.11.1986 01.01.1987
Valais 13.11.1987 01.07.1988
Schaffhausen 06.06.1988 01.07.1988
Vaud 09.11.1988 01.01.1989
Jura 24.02.1989 01.07.1989
Uri 08.06.1989 01.01.1990
Geneva 27.09.1989 01.01.1990
Schaffhausen 06.11.1989 01.01.1990
Canton
Announcement
Date
Implementation
Date
Valais 28.09.1990 01.01.1991
Vaud 30.11.1990 01.01.1991
Neuchatel 03.12.1990 01.01.1991
Jura 04.12.1990 01.01.1991
Geneva 12.12.1990 01.01.1991
Lucerne 18.12.1990 01.01.1991
Fribourg 18.02.1991 01.03.1991
Jura 16.04.1991 01.10.1991
Solothurn 15.10.1991 01.01.1992
Schwyz 08.12.1991 01.01.1992
Valais 06.04.1992 01.01.1993
Jura 20.09.1992 01.01.1993
Solothurn 12.11.1992 01.01.1993
Uri 08.12.1992 01.01.1993
Vaud 26.11.1993 01.01.1994
Lucerne 13.09.1994 01.01.1995
Uri 28.09.1994 01.01.1995
Fribourg 13.11.1995 01.01.1996
Jura 21.11.1995 01.01.1996
Valais 11.09.1996 01.01.1997
Vaud 24.09.1996 01.01.1997
Uri 13.11.1996 01.01.1997
Neuchatel 27.11.1996 01.01.1997
Schaffhausen 05.09.1999 01.01.2000
Jura 31.10.2000 01.01.2001
Valais 23.09.2001 01.01.2002
Neuchatel 01.12.2004 01.01.2005
Jura 26.11.2006 01.01.2007
Valais 31.10.2007 01.01.2008
Solothurn 16.11.2007 01.01.2008
Valais 11.09.2008 01.01.2009
Schwyz 28.09.2008 01.01.2009
Jura 25.11.2008 01.01.2009
Lucerne 28.11.2008 01.01.2009
Geneva 23.06.2011 01.01.2012
Notes: This Table gives detailed information on every policy change regarding birth allowances in Switzer-
land starting in 1969 and informs about the announcement date and about the implementation date of
each stated change.
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Table C.2: Excluding Early Adopters: Fertility Outcomes
Dependent variable
Log of total
births
Total fertility
rate
Crude birth
rate
Dummy specification
Birth allowance (dummy)=1 0.0241 0.0387 0.198
(0.0318) (0.0327) (0.368)
Linear value specification
Birth allowance (value/100) 0.00408 0.00191 0.0378
(0.00457) (0.00395) (0.0517)
Quadratic value specification
Birth allowance (value/100) 0.00369 0.00757 0.0488
(0.00532) (0.00621) (0.0584)
Birth allowance (quadratic) 0.0000382 -0.000424 -0.00105
(0.000146) (0.000269) (0.00161)
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.399 1.621 11.739
Observations 1,116 851 1,072
Notes: This Table is estimated on the sample of control and treated cantons excluding those cantons
(Geneva, Vaud, and Fribourg) which introduced the baby bonus before 1969. Robust and clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses. All estimates are weighted by number of births in the
canton-year cell. Significance at the 99%/95%/90% level is indicated with ***/**/*. We report the
coefficient α on the treatment dummy/intensity Dct of Equation (3.1) where we control for time-varying
canton-level characteristics, year and canton fixed effects, and linear and quadratic canton-specific time
trends. In the intensity specifications, we include the value divided by 100 in 2015 Swiss francs.
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Table C.4: Municipality Level Specification: Fertility Outcomes
Dependent variable
Log of total
births
Total fertility
rate
Crude birth
rate
Dummy specification
Birth allowance (dummy)=1 0.0985 0.0453 0.686
(0.0663) (0.0470) (0.678)
Linear value specification
Birth allowance (value/100) 0.0171*** 0.00333 0.0530*
(0.00513) (0.00206) (0.0293)
Quadratic value specification
Birth allowance (value/100) 0.0289** 0.0145 0.210
(0.0139) (0.00992) (0.140)
Birth allowance (quadratic) -0.000631 -0.000506 -0.00710
(0.000522) (0.000405) (0.00566)
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.515 1.621 11.762
Observations 103,919 79,000 79,000
Notes: This Table is estimated on the full sample of control and treated cantons. The observational
unit in this specification is at the municipal level. Robust and clustered standard errors are reported in
parentheses. All estimates are weighted by number of births in the municipality-year cell. Significance
at the 99%/95%/90% level is indicated with ***/**/*. We report the coefficient α on the treatment
dummy/intensity Dct of Equation (3.1) where we control for time-varying municipality-level character-
istics, year and municipality fixed effects, and linear and quadratic canton-specific time trends. In the
intensity specifications, we include the value divided by 100 in 2015 Swiss francs.
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Table C.6: Placebo Estimation: Fertility Outcomes
Dependent variable
Log of total
births
Total fertility
rate
Crude birth
rate
Linear value specification
Birth allowance (value/100) 0.00170 -0.000862 0.0274
(0.00226) (0.00217) (0.0271)
Birth allowance (t+1) 0.000421 -0.00133 0.00403
(0.00265) (0.00409) (0.0278)
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.515 1.621 11.762
Observations 1,237 936 1,187
Notes: This Table is estimated on the full sample of control and treated cantons. Robust and clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses. All estimates are weighted by number of births in the canton-
year cell. Significance at the 99%/95%/90% level is indicated with ***/**/*. We report the coefficient
α on the treatment dummy/intensity Dct of Equation (3.1) where we control for time-varying canton-
level characteristics, year and canton fixed effects, linear and quadratic canton-specific time trends and
additionally for Dc(t+1), which we also report in this Table. In the intensity specifications, we include
the value divided by 100 in 2015 Swiss francs.
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